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ABSTRACT

UNCONVENTIONAL W ARF ARE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
TURKISH COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THEIR WESTERN INSPIRA nON
Nicholas A. Warndorf
April 19, 2013
This thesis examines the counterinsurgency efforts of the Ottoman Empire during the
First World War and the evolutionary process through which those techniques were
created. The importance of this is to demonstrate the ever changing nature of warfare as
well as the adaptability a counterinsurgent requires. It also demonstrates how the West
practiced counterinsurgency techniques over a decade before the First World War and
that those techniques often led to civilian suffering. By comparing the British and
American experiences with insurgency in South Africa and the Philippines, this thesis
shows that population control is one of the most effective counterinsurgency techniques.
This assertion is based on research of previous counterinsurgents as well as Western
doctrine. This thesis provides evidence that the Ottoman decision to deport large numbers
of Armenians was a decision made out of necessity, and considered the most effective
counterinsurgency technique in the midst of World War I.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"Counterinsurgency is an old issue with new currency in the twenty-first
century ... Counterinsurgency is an issue area where there are many scholarpractitioners (in contrast to other areas of security studies) which gives their
writings a certain immediacy and applicability. Many of these scholarpractitioners are engaged in trying to change the way the militaries understand
and fight these 'hearts and mind'} , campaigns. ,,/
Joanna Spear, Security Studies, 2008
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the Ottoman military application of
counterinsurgency in Eastern Anatolia during the First World War. It argues that by
isolating and or removing civilian populations from areas of unrest and rebellion, the
Ottoman government was able to quell insurgencies, with particular attention given to a
rebellion in the city of Van. Historically, the Ottoman Empire has been misrepresented in
the West to the point of only basic recognition. To the average observer, mention of the
Ottomans or the Turks can either generate discontent and preconceived notions of
barbarity or a kind of adolescent admiration for the exotic though it is not fully
understood. This is mainly because the Ottoman Empire's reputation has been so diluted
by past Western observers that their history, especially their military, is riddled with such
condemnation that the truth has nearly become indecipherable. It is necessary to examine
the great civilizations of the past with an open mind and without prejudice if we are to
better understand the present and hopefully prepare for the future.

I Joanna Spear, "Counterinsurgency," in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams,
(New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 389.
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The nature of warfare has always and will continue to be a process of
evolutionary thought in overcoming one's enemies. Contrary to popular belief of the
uninitiated, warfare is far more complicated than the number of men and the type of
equipment that is used. It is by definition "a conflict carried on by force of arms, as
between nations or between parties within a nation.,,2 The nature of such conflicts can
take a number of different forms. Most widely recognized, of course, is large scale
conflict that occurs between nations. Warfare, though, is not always the product of
disagreements among giants. In many cases throughout history, it has been an outlet for
emerging groups or minorities within a nation in an attempt to throw off the repressive
yolk of a larger, more powerful opponent.
The opponent can be an invader or the governmental structure of one's own
nation. Governments have an inherent need to control their population, whether it be for
reasons of utilitarian good, striving for the most agreeable living conditions in the minds
of the masses, or as an attempt to repress and control the masses for the benefit of a few.
The answer for the minority has often been that of the protracted or prolonged "small
war," also known as the guerrilla war or insurgency. Such warfare is perhaps the greatest
enemy to the continuity of a nation because it is a conflict bred from within. Therefore, in
an effort to combat such threats, nations are forced to adapt and invent new measures in
order to overcome an almost invisible force which gains momentum with every small
victory. The United States Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps define such
tactics in their Small Wars Manual:

2

"War," last modified December 10,2012, http://dictionary.reference.comlbrowse/war
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As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under
executive authority, wherein military force combined with diplomatic pressure in the
internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate
unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the
foreign policy of a nation. 3

Although the Small Wars Manual was published in 1940, it is one of the first doctrinal
manuals published on the subject. References to various western manuals throughout the
twentieth century illuminate the evolution of military thought, as well as an effort to
combat the changing nature of warfare.
Vilification of the Ottoman military in historical adaptations has led to the belief
among many scholars that during the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had made a
conscious effort to eradicate rural populations of Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. Upon
further scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent that the Ottomans felt they must act,
fearing the potential threat of a Russian invasion by developing a fifth column4
insurgency using discontented Anatolian Armenians. This thesis argues that the Ottoman
counterinsurgency efforts were bred of a perceived necessity and not a targeted
aggression toward any specific religious or ethnic group. By comparing
counterinsurgency efforts of the Ottomans to those of the Americans in the Philippines
and the British approach in South Africa, this thesis demonstrates that the Ottomans were
merely adapting contemporary counterinsurgency measures which had already been used
before by their Western counterparts. Such etlorts mainly focused on the use of forced

3 Department of the Navy and the USMC, Small Wars Manual (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1940), sect. I-I p. I
4 The term "Fifth Column" was first applied in 1936 to rebel sympathizers inside Madrid when
four columns of rebel troops were attacking that city. The term is defined as "a clandestine subversive
organization working within a given country to further an invading enemy's military and political aims.
(see The American Heritage Dictionary, [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982], "fifth column".)
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relocations and civilian re-concentration. One only has to examine modem examples such
as Sri Lanka in order to grasp the concept.
The Ottoman soldier was among the most courageous, obedient and steadfast of
battle implements to have ever been applied to warfare. Their bravery alone was enough
to merit recognition that would resonate in the pages of history. Unfortunately, this is
often distorted in the twenty first century. Among the many scholars of the Middle East,
only a few recognize the inadequacies of past research and manage to give credit where it
is due regarding Muslim soldiers. Illusive histories and subjective recollections from the
winning side of World War I have often been the source by which all others follow. This
thesis sheds light on at least one element of Ottoman military conduct during the First
World War that is still widely and sometimes veraciously debated today.
A primary argument that this thesis also makes is that the nature of insurgency
demands a level of adaptation and evolution that is often difficult to understand for those
unfamiliar with irregular warfare. The approach to insurgency by Western empires
differed little from the approaches used by the Ottoman Empire to secure areas of
contention through the isolation of civilian populations. None has proven more influential
or controversial than the calculated use of concentration camps and relocation. This is
evident in the examination of the American application in the Spanish-American War of
1898, the Philippine-American war of 1899-1902, and the British use of concentration
camps during the Second Boer War of 1899-1902. Each conflict predates the First World
War and remains an example of Western technique 5 which the Ottomans later used.

5 Technique is the appropriate word to use because the concept of a standardized doctrine in
counterinsurgency operations was not effectively developed until after World War II. Therefore, for the
purposes of this paper, I have chosen to use the word "technique" in order to refer to western and Ottoman
counterinsurgency measures rather than "doctrine," which is the accepted designation today.
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Based on historical evidence and the insights of contemporary Middle Eastern military
scholars, the Ottoman response was not only appropriate but viewed as ultimately
necessary, in the context of the time, to insure the continuity of the Empire. Faced with
heavy Russian opposition and the threat of a potential fifth column from the Ottoman
Armenian Christians of Eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman Empire responded to internal
threats in a way intended to save their Muslim subjects that were dying by the millions,
while also repelling a Russian invasion during World War I.
The threat of insurgency is not a new concept. However, the need to combat
unconventional warfare while maintaining political integrity abroad has become a
growing concern for virtually every emerging super power of the last three hundred
years. With regard to quelling rebellion and fighting an enemy within, few nations have
received more consistent scrutiny than the Turks. Wartime propaganda and
sensationalism of the Western press during World War I has persisted even today, calling
the Ottoman response to internal security threats" genocide" and "massacre" of innocent
civilians. 6 The reality, however, is that Armenian rebels who were willing to utilize
murder, kidnapping, public executions, propaganda, smuggling, bombings, and desertion
from the Ottoman military - virtually anything that would weaken the Turks - often goes
unmentioned.
Genocide is not a valid accusation when examining this period of Ottoman
history. By definition, the word means "The systematic, planned annihilation of a racial,
political, or cultural group.,,7 Modem scholars of the subject often point to the Turkish
relocation of Armenians during the war as the definitive moment that marked their
6 "Armenian Genocide," last modified April 16.,2012,
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/armeniangenocide.html
7 The American Heritage Dictionary, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982), "Genocide"
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planned annihilation. History has proven, however, that the West has a short memory
with regard to insurgency techniques. The relocation of perceived combatants has been
common with regard to national security in Western military practice both before and
since World War I, with the use of internment by the British during the Second Boer War
and also by the United States during World War II with the internment of Japanese
Americans following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Ottoman military showed
remarkable restraint in times of great emotional turmoil regarding relocation and securing
areas under insurgent control. Recent research has also shown that according to Ottoman
records, Turkish military conduct was often the equivalent, ifnot superior, to Western
military conduct when fighting an unconventional war.
The study of irregular or unconventional warfare during the First World War is
essential if both scholars and practitioners are to better understand the changing nature of
twenty-first century conflict with any nation, against any enemy, both foreign and
domestic. Karl Von Clausewitz, soldier and military theorist wrote that "Theory exists so
that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and ploughing [sic]
through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the
mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education,
not accompany him to the battlefield."g Contemplation and adaptation are not enough if
one does not recognize the successes and failures of past engagements, wherever and
whenever they may have occurred.
Contemporary military doctrine of the West and tested attempts at subduing
civilian populations are proof enough that although such methods continue to receive

8 David Lonsdale, "Strategy," in Understanding Modern Warfare, ed. David Lonsdale et al. (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 20.
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condemnation, they are nevertheless continually applied to combat unconventional
warfare. The difference between the early twentieth century and present
counterinsurgency measures is that there is heavier focus today on a more humanitarian
solution. By the comparison of Ottoman techniques to their Western precursors, this
thesis argues that their methods were learned and adapted, not invented. That is why I
have chosen to focus heavily on the formation of the Ottoman military and how their own
experiences in the Balkans helped to shape their approach to Eastern Anatolia. It is also
why I have chosen to compare those methods to the current military doctrine of the
United States, as well as the practices of both the British and Americans prior to World
War I. Their experiences highlight the reality that sometimes, the focus on achieving
victory can overshadow the concern for reducing collateral damage. They also prove that
in over one hundred years, controlling the population is still the paramount concern in
unconventional warfare.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY

Among the many problems with research on the First World War and Ottoman
approaches to irregular warfare are the glaring gaps in research on the subject.
Definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency are often too vague or contradictory, if
they are even mentioned at all. Ottoman relocations and civilian concentration is roundly
criticized as genocide and calculated pogroms against the Armenian people. Yet, at the
same time, western recollections of past engagements using the same methods are
referred to as re-concentration in the Spanish American war and the Philippines,
Internment camps during WWII, strategic hamlets in Vietnam9 , and camps in South
Africa during the Second Boer War. Regardless of one's position on the subject, it is
undeniable that civilian non-combatants generally pay the greatest price in war.
Regarding insurgencies, however, knowing the difference between combatant and noncombatant becomes incredibly difficult.
For this reason, I have taken a three pronged approach to my argument regarding
methodology and sources. First, I explain the evolution of Ottoman military strategy and
how their experiences in the Balkans and military restructuring led to their
counterinsurgency techniques used in the First World War. This section focuses heavily
on the rebellion at Van and how the Armenian struggle against the Ottoman government
9 Thomas L. Ahem Jr., Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency. (Lexington: The
University Press of Kentucky, 20 I 0), 76-78.
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can be classified as an insurgency. By focusing on the Ottomans first and their military
tactics prior to and during World War I, it is my argument that the empire mainly acted in
the interest of self preservation and not out of religious or ethnic hatred regarding the
Armenians of eastern Anatolia.
Secondly, in order to encompass theory and practice, that is, what is written by
scholars and how applicable such theories are on the ground, I have decided to utilize
both scholarly examinations of previous conflicts for their historical context as well as
doctrinal practice in western military manuals on counterinsurgency. Accompanying the
scholarly interpretations of irregular warfare, I have also chosen to apply the writings of
both insurgents and counterinsurgents such as Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara, and T.E.
Lawrence among others. These two different perspectives are referenced throughout my
thesis but are mainly used regarding the application of concentration and relocation by
Great Britain and America. Focusing on each country's respective conflicts and their own
experiences with insurgency abroad provides a framework for comparing how two
western empires conducted counterinsurgency prior to the Ottomans.
The third aspect of my research is an analysis of the western approach versus the
Ottoman approach to counterinsurgency, highlighting their similarities and their
differences. Pointing to both western adaptations of war and Ottoman adaptations paints a
more accurate picture regarding the fickle nature of historical representation. By using
such methods, this thesis asserts that through the comparison and contrast of Ottoman
counterinsurgency techniques ofthe First World War to their western precursors the
research reflects that Ottoman methods were learned and adapted, not invented. It is also
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intended to demonstrate that the nature of irregular warfare demands drastic measures
from any nation.
In studying the art of unconventional warfare, it is essential to consult the
expertise of previous practitioners. Irregular war can be traced back to the Old Testament
in the first and second books of Maccabee. The stories describe the Jewish family of
Maccabeus' guerrilla campaign of irregular warfare against their Syrian oppressors, led
by Judas Maccabeus. The stories tell of their insurgent efforts which ended in a treaty
with the Syrians in 158 BCE. IO Perhaps the most recognizable figure in the nature of
warfare with special emphasis on irregular tactics, however, dates back to fifth century
China and writings in Sun Tzu's The Art of War. The book is a collection of writings by
Chinese military strategists written for the sole purpose of attaining victory and
overcoming one's enemies, both on and off the battlefield. The significance of these
references is the recognition that not only is the concept of irregular warfare an ancient
contemplation, it is also evolving with every new generation of soldier and the
implements of war that he or she uses. On the use of military force, Sun Tzu writes:
The military is a Tao of deception -Thus when able, manifest inability. When
active, manifest inactivity. When near, manifest as far. When far, manifest as near. Thus
when he seeks advantage, lure him. When he is in chaos, take him. When he is
substantial, prepare against him. When he is strong, avoid him. When he is wrathful,
harass him. Attack where he is unprepared. Emerge where he does not expect it. II

In hindsight the concept seems simple enough. It is important to remember,
however, that such notions of warfare can apply to the offensive and defensive
movements of both a larger and smaller force. The West has dealt with a number of
10 Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and their
opponents since 1750 (London: Routledge, 200 I), I
II Sun Tzu, The Art of War trans. The Denma Translation Group (Boston: Shambhala Publications
Inc., 2002), 5.
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instances in a number of theaters where numbers do not always count for everything.
This is evident throughout the colonial expansion period of western empires abroad and
continued into the island fighting of the Pacific during World War II. It is even more
prevalent in the twenty-first century with coalition forces' efforts in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
Many scholarly sources point to a number of different aspects that must be
considered when fighting an unconventional war. Definitions of warfare, of which there
are many, can often be misleading and malleable to virtually any situation. David
Lonsdale, Professor from the Department of Politics and International Studies at the
University of Hull argues that, "Definitions (of war) that focus simply on body count are
simplistic to the point of absurdity, ignoring the political and legal implications of
defining war, in addition to saying nothing about the actual conduct of military
operations.,,[2 Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, it is essential to narrow down the
varying degrees of warfare and how it applies to the Ottomans by focusing on what types
of irregular warfare exist. James Kiras, Professor at Air University of the United States
Air Force from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, has argued that there are
in fact five forms of irregular warfare which are adequately described in this table from a
book he coauthored titled Understanding Modern Warfare.

11

Lonsdale, "Strategy." 1.
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Table 2.1 Forms oflrregular Warfare

13

Type

Resources

Center of
Gravity

Mechanism

Strategic
Orientation

Tactical
Orientation

Duration

Coup d'etat

Few

Offensive

Immediate

Few

Seizure of
power
Coercion

Offensive

Terrorism

Offensive

Offensive

Lengthy

Revolution

Vanguard,
growing to
many
Varied, but
often
significant

Elites
(organize)
Elites
(influence)
Population
(Stimulate)

Defensive

Offensive

As quickly
as possible

Defensive,
switching to
offensive

Offensive,
given local
superiority

Lengthy

Varies

Varies

Varies

Insurgency

Civil War

Varies

Population
(Control)

Varies

Popular
support
(uprising)
Denial
leading to
victory over
or
withdrawal
of opponent
Denial or
negotiated
settlement

It is necessary to examine the meaning of insurgency and counterinsurgency from

a variety of sources in order to better understand the complexities of unconventional
warfare. By defining the two and their application in past and present military conflicts, it
is my intention to clarify such encompassing concepts to better direct the reader toward a
clear understanding of the topic. It would be unwise to focus on all forms of irregular
warfare because the scope of such a topic exceeds the capacity of this thesis. It is also
necessary to recognize the importance of the "center of gravity" distinction in defining
forms of warfare. Though the specific class of society is subject to change with the type
of warfare, the fact remains that the focus is on the civilian population.

13 James Kiras, "Irregular Warfare," In Understanding Modern Warfare, ed. James Kiras et al.
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 234.
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Insurgency
The revolutionaries almost invariably find it easier to establish themselves in the
'countryside'- isolated, difficult terrain where the governing authorities are weakest,
know least what is going-on, and show the least interest. Here the revolutionary political
network and propagandists manage to get enough recruits to form their terrorists into
small, local guerrilla bands. 14

Though the "countryside" argument has been disproven by the American
Revolution and American experiences in Iraq during the twenty-first century, the
countryside still remains an effective place to begin. An insurgency is a threat which
generally builds from within a country due to hostility toward the government or a
foreign occupying power. A guerrilla war is often the vehicle by which a smaller
insurgent force makes their demands known to the larger, more powerful opponent when
all other negotiations have failed. In many cases, armed conflict begins by way of the
guerrilla war, with the guerrilla or partisan as its warrior. Where regular armies fight in
open conflict with one another on a large scale, the guerrilla often chooses to utilize hitand-run tactics whereby smaller, irregular fighting forces conduct surprise attacks on
larger forces and then dissolve into their indigenous habitat. The favored techniques of
insurgents include, but are not limited to: bombs and bomb making, coercion,
kidnapping, assassination, terrorism, bribery, theft, and any number of other approaches
that will provide expediency toward their ultimate goal. Such techniques are intended to
destabilize the government or invader by constantly keeping them on the defensive
against a force which they cannot directly assault due to its clandestine nature and natural
cover within their own indigenous elements such as jungles, cities, and mountainous
terrain.
14 10hn 1. McCuen, The Art o(Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy o/Counter Insurgency
(Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966),33.
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According to Bard O'Neill, professor of international affairs at the National War
College in Washington, D.C., there are three groups of people who fit the ideal criteria
within an insurgency which provide favorable conditions: Parochials, Subjects and
Participants. O'Neill argues that Parochials are, "Those citizens who have little or no
awareness of the political system at the national level and no perception of their ability to
influence it." These individuals are generally illiterate, live at the subsistence level in
isolated areas and generally prefer to be left alone. Such individuals can be compared to
Kurdish tribes in Anatolia, the Arabs of Saudi Arabia and the Armenians of eastern
Anatolia. Subjects "have become part of the political system and are aware of its impact
on their lives but are not directly active in shaping policy." Participants "are generally
educated citizens who are cognizant of national political institutions and policies and
wish to engage actively in the decision-making process." These individuals are generally
educated, confident of their impact on policy change and vulnerable to recruitment by
insurgents. This is perhaps because their involvement offers a shortcut to political
recognition that would otherwise take time within a system of bureaucratic policy and
regulation - a system which they already condemn. 15
According to the United States Army and the Marine Corps, there are a number of
different forms that an insurgency can take. 16 One is of a conspiratorial nature; an
example of this being the Bolshevik revolution of twentieth century Russia or the Young
Turk rebellion of the Ottoman Empire in 1908. Conspiratorial insurgencies involve
exactly what the name implies, groups of conspirators meeting in secret, generally

15 Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, (Washington
D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2005),83
16 United States Department of the Anny, The us. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field
Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 114
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educated, dreaming up plans to overthrow the government. Another form is of a military
focused nature. Examples of this can be found all over Latin America, but perhaps the
most influential would be the efforts of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in Cuba. This form
of warfare is also known as "Focoism," I 7 which consists of small paramilitary bands of
fighters using an insurrection itself to create the conditions necessary to overthrow the
government. 18 Therefore, if bands of resistance fighters defy the government, the
government response, which can sometimes be violent, targets any and all suspects,
showing the true nature of the government and drawing attention to the guerrillas' cause.
Urban insurgencies are those fought mainly in heavily populated urban centers,
usually within key districts or cities which are crucial to a nations' stability. An example
of this would be the efforts of AI-Qaeda, The Taliban and the IRA (Irish Republican
Army). Perhaps the most recognizable form of urban insurgency would be the efforts of
the IRA. They remain without question an example of what has been called a "surgical"
approach to irregular warfare within the confines of an urban environment. 19 Protracted
Popular Warfare is the form of insurgency that Mao Tse-tung utilized in the Chinese
Revolution and was later adapted by the North Vietnamese. This form of warfare is
meant to create popular support for governmental reorganization by draining the enemy
of resources, man power and the will to carryon the fight with a political ideology in
place, which in China and Vietnam's case was communism. 2o

17 The tenn was inspired by the Cuban revolution but is perhaps more recognizable as a "peoples
war" and how it has since been adopted by AI-Qaeda and the Taliban.
18 This has also been referred to as the "ink-blot" effect, a comparison to the nature of ink drops on
paper beginning small in various locations and slowly spreading from its point of contact.
19 Patrick D. Marques, "Guerrilla Warfare Tactics in Urban Environments" (M.A. Thesis, US
Anny Command and General Staff College, 2003) 23-24.
20 United States Department of the Anny, The u.s. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field
Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 9
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Co unterinsurgency
The accumulated effect of these revolutionary wars, and there seems to be no end
to them, is extremely serious and vitally concerns us all. Whatever the result, the
protracted nature of each struggle does immense long-term damage, particularly to rural
communities where, to add to all the other problems, the population is increasing at an
alarming rate. The so-called newly emerging forc(;:s are rapidly in danger of becoming the
~
.
luture
starvmg
masses. 21

Counterinsurgency is the process by which a government or an outside force
attempts to reverse the effects of insurgency within a nation that is on the verge of
internal collapse or has already imploded. According to the U.S. Army and Marine
Corps, "Today, when countering an insurgency growing from state collapse or failure,
counterinsurgents often face a more daunting task: helping friendly forces reestablish
political order and legitimacy where these conditions no longer exist.,,22

It must be said and cannot be overstated that the versatility of counterinsurgency
requires a special breed of unit commander to face the challenges of such dynamic
obstacles. There are a number of reasons why guerTillas/insurgents are frustrating to
regular forces, but perhaps the most frustrating aspects are that they do not don
conventional uniforms, they are not bound by a military code of conduct, and their
support base can come from anywhere at any time.

23

Guerrillas also adapt faster than regular forces because they have to and there is
little doctrine behind their tactics, it is mostly theory in practice. All warfare is ever
changing; however, guerrilla warfare or insurgencies are often a reaction to modernity,
political change and combating the technology of the future using more elementary
21 Robert Thompson, introduction to The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of
Counter Insurgency; by John J. McCuen (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966), 15
22 US Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 8
23 Department of the Navy and the USMC. Small Wars Manual (Washington: The United States
Government Printing Office, 1940), sect. 1-8 p. 12
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methods and techniques. Due to this fact, insurgents/guerrillas are typically forced to
change their strategies rapidly and regularly in order to adapt and respond to their foes.
So too must the counterinsurgent adapt their tactics in order to reverse engineer the
effects of an insurgency.
This is exactly what Colonel 10hn 1. McCuen argued in his book The Art of

Counter-Revolutionary War. McCuen, who was an expert on insurgency and served a
number of staff positions in the United States, Indonesia, Vietnam, Germany and
Thailand, argues that the only way to fight an insurgency is to understand its structure
and principles and then reverse the effects of each based on the phase of warfare in which
the insurgency resides. McCuen argues that "A m,tior technique of revolutionary strategy
is to deceive the governing authorities into making too little effort too late with tactics
inappropriate to the particular stage of the war:,24 That is to say, the intent from the
beginning is deception; to lure the enemy into a false sense of security so that a random
strike will not only be a surprise but confusing. McCuen's book was published in 1966,
making it more of a reaction to Mao's form of warfare, "the protracted war" or "people's
war." The revolutionary war, which was a popular view at the time, refers to a swift form
of warfare aimed at regime change, whereas an insurgency aims at resistance and denial
of enemy aims.
McCuen asserts that there are four phases of strategic evolution in insurgencies.
The first phase is Organization - involving the uses of propaganda and recruitment in
order to supplement the ranks of the insurgency. The second phase is Terrorism, which
would involve small attacks on key targets in order to draw attention to the cause. The

24 John J. McCuen, The Art o/Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy o{Counter Insurgency
(Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1966),
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third is Guerrilla warfare in which case the terrorist cells begin to form cohesive units and
strategically carry out hit-and-run attacks. The last phase is Mobile Warfare, which is an
overt war against the govemment. 25 McCuen does stipulate that these phases often
overlap each other and can occur at different phases in different parts of the same
country. This is not important, however, because what truly matters for the
counterinsurgent is the recognition of which phase: he is combating. This is how, McCuen
argues, one becomes capable of combating an insurgency. Recognition will then, by
implication, lead to a reversal of the process. Counterinsurgency is not as simple as just
fighting fire with fire, throwing clandestine commandos at guerrillas in the bushes,
mountains and jungles.
Mao Tse-tung wrote, "What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people?
Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do
not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and
assistance cannot be gained.,,26 If the aim of the counterinsurgent is to reverse the effects
of the insurgency, then he too must gain the support and confidence of the indigenous
population. Mao has been widely considered one of history's greatest
guerrillaslinsurgents, specifically because of his expertise developed from deep
philosophical reflections and a unique understanding of the Chinese people. However, his
concepts and conviction were not met with immediate support. In fact, it was not until
mounting Communist losses, fighting in plain sight, that Mao's approach was adopted?7

Ibid, 40
Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith" (Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 2000), 43.
27 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies, 72.
25
26
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Mao recognized the importance and necessity of support, but he also recognized the need
for regaining the upper hand through organization and support from within.
This is why it is also necessary to recognize the cultural dynamics of a conflict if
one intends to combat an insurgency. McCuen focuses very little on this aspect. O'Neill
states that any analysis of insurgency would be "seriously deficient" if it ignores a
country's political culture. O'Neill argues, "Hence:, an effort to understand and profile the
political carefully is very important; in doing so, students of insurgency need to rely on
the expertise of regional and country specialists, particularly historians, anthropologists,
and sociologists.,,28 Knowing the regional dynamics is an obvious path to defeating an
insurgency. Knowing one's enemy is one of the bt:st ways to counter his efforts.
That being said, it pays to understand the indigenous population and their feelings
toward the insurgency itself. One reason for this is to better understand their level of
tolerance. O'Neill argues that "Where there is a low tolerance for violence, insurgent
recruitment will suffer, and violent acts, particularly dramatic, terrorist ones, will
probably be considered repugnant, ifnot counterproductive.,,29 This is an important point
because it illustrates that the indigenous population can either be the greatest weapon
against an insurgency or the counterinsurgents' worst fear. Take for example the negative
reaction of Italians toward the Red Brigades in the kidnap and murder of Prime Minister
Aldo Moro in 1978. Or, yet another example is the negative public reaction to the
indiscriminate killing of foreign tourists at Luxor in Egypt in 1997. Both examples are
proof that if the insurgents miscalculate the threshold of tolerance that the public has for
their cause then it can break their organization. However, the same can be said of

28

O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism" 85.

29

Ibid
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counterinsurgents' efforts. If brutal tactics are applied in a manner that the public is not
willing to accept, it can easily draw recruits to the insurgency and become
counterproductive.

Techniques of the Counterinsurgent
Counterinsurgency operations are labor intensive and often depend upon a large
force in order to suppress enemy forces and influence. Counterinsurgents must maintain
order and security over a wide area where the insurgents only have to remain hidden and
strike whenever and wherever they like. Insurgents do, however, have a number of
vulnerabilities that the counterinsurgents can then utilize and exploit to their advantage in
reversing the effects of an insurgency. One is their need for secrecy. The level of secrecy
required in starting and maintaining an insurgency makes it very difficult for its fighters
to relax and know who to trust. There is also a need to establish bases which depends on
the natural cover and support of the local population, if there is one. There are
inconsistencies in mobilizing guerrilla forces because of the difficulties of
communication. Cohesive action as a collective unit can be difficult when there are
communication challenges. There is heavy reliance on external support in order to sustain
and maintain guerrilla forces with a special emphasis on financial backing. If that lifeline
is ever severed then the insurgency is hard pressed to survive. There is a constant need to
maintain momentum and to present a cause worth fighting for as well as a display of
one's victories. This prevents desertion, internal divisions and a drop in morale. Finally,
there is the greatest threat from informants within the insurgency.3D

30
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With so many weaknesses looming within and around an insurgent organization,
it would seem that combating such a threat with an overwhelming force would be easy to
accomplish. However, the reality is often much different. The greatest challenge in
countering an insurgency is knowing the acceptable level of force to apply. The US Army
presently states that, "Extremist insurgent combatants often have to be killed. In any case,
however, counterinsurgents should calculate carefilllly the type and amount of force to be
applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is
counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the: recruitment of fifty more
insurgents.,,3] If this is the case then where is the middle ground? It is a safe assumption
that a lack of force can also result in the recruitment of more insurgents because it can be
interpreted as a sign of weakness. Insurgent propaganda during the recruitment phase,
according to the phases laid out by McCuen, can also claim that the frailty of the enemy
is an indication of success.
In many cases throughout the history of insurgencies, the indigenous forces rely
heavily upon the local inhabitants for cover, food, supplies, information and
communication. One way of combating the threat of insurgency's and exploiting their
weaknesses, is to prevent them from establishing bases and cutting off their
supply/support network. Hypothetically, counterinsurgents can try to be everywhere at
once or they can remove the civilian population and establish the insurgent area as a war
zone or danger zone. Anyone remaining within that zone can then be considered a
combatant and dealt with accordingly. The concentrated population or deportees are then
moved to a safe zone under government and local protection to establish order in an area.
Such techniques are also intended to combat the insurgent threat while minimizing the

,I us Anny, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 45
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collateral damage and civilian suffering, or so it is intended in planning. A reason for
removing civilians from the equation is illustrated by the Department of the Navy and the
USMC:
Frequently irregulars kill and rob peaceful citizens in order to obtain supplies
which are then secreted in remote strongholds. Seizure and destruction of such sources of
supply is an important factor in reducing their means of resistance. Such methods of
operation must be studied and adapted to the psychological reaction they will produce
upon the opponents. 32

The statement is a compelling argument which encompasses the potential threat from an
indigenous population in foreign and domestic conflicts. It also assists in illustrating the
motivations for isolating civilians in areas of contention in order to weed out the threat.

32 Department of the Navy and the USMC, Small Wars Manual (Washington: The United States
Government Printing Office, 1940), sect. 1-8 p.12-13
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CHAPTER III
OTTOMAN COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE REBELLION AT V AN

"In war, knowing how to recognize and seize an opportunity is the most important
ability.

,,33

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art o/War, 1519-1520

Study of the construction of the Ottoman Military is necessary in order to paint a
more accurate picture of the Turkish soldier and their commanders. Evidence shows that
there are a number of myths about the Ottoman military which must be rectified if one is
to understand the mind set and the discipline of Ottoman soldiers during the First World
War. This chapter also provides examples of how Ottomans dealt with rebellion in the
past as well as how Western powers have dealt with them since in order to show the
effectiveness of the counterinsurgency techniques which have been applied by both. This
chapter demonstrates that the Armenian rebel network was both vast and sophisticated,
posing a very real threat to the Ottoman empire during the First World War. And finally,
this chapter demonstrates the effects of Ottoman counterinsurgency in Eastern Anatolia.
Perhaps the most pertinent aspect, however, is the mindset of the Ottoman soldier and the
formation of the Turkish military.

33 Peter Constantine, ed. & trans., The Essential Writings of Machiavelli. (New York: The Modem
Library, 2007), 312.
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The Ottoman Military and Popular Mythology
According to Dr. Edward J. Erickson, military historian and retired U.S. Army Lt.
Colonel, there are five myths about the Turkish military that often go unchecked. One
myth is that the Germans during the First World War commanded and planned most of
the Ottoman operations throughout the war. 34 Statements like this have degraded the
military talents of more than capable commanders in the Turkish military such as
Mustafa Kemal, the man primarily responsible for the Turkish defeat of the Entente
powers during the disastrous Gallipoli campaign of 1915-1916. 35 Erickson says that men
like Mustafa Kemal "fall into this category of audacious combat leaders without whose
presence a Turkish victory is questionable. ,,36 It is from this Turkish commander that the
famous quote: "I do not expect you to attack, I order you to die! In the time which passes
until we die, other troops and commanders can take our place!" is an example of the
Turkish military mindset. 37 Many contemporary scholars tend to exaggerate the influence
of the contending entente powers with regard to Ottoman longevity in resisting foreign
powers throughout the war. Most accounts would portray a sense of disloyalty and
disunity among the entente powers as a reason for Turkish resilience. Such ideas merely
ignore or underestimate the contributions of the Ottoman military, which fought a war on
multiple fronts against multiple enemies, both foreign and domestic. 38

34 Edward 1. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History a/the Ottoman Army in the First World War,
(London: Greenwood Press, 2001, 214
35 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 79-95
36 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 85
37 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 83
38 Mesut Uyar, Edward 1. Erickson, A Military History ()(the Ottomans: From Osman to Ataturk,
(Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, 2009), 282
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The second myth is that the Ottoman government and the Turkish military kept
poor records.

39

Nothing could be further from the truth. Erickson argues that "the

Ottomans literally invented bureaucracy and red tape, and they kept most of their records
no matter how trivial," and that "The Turkish General Staff Archives alone contain 1.5
million documents on the First World War.,,40 This is at least some indication of the
obsessive record keeping of the Ottomans. A problem which is often overlooked is that
many scholars rely mainly on Western sources rather than Ottoman records because they
are primarily in Turkish.
The third is that Ottoman units were prone to desertion during combat and that
they had a tendency to disintegrate under the pressure of war. The truth is, according to
Erickson, that the units which had historically

sufD~red

mass disintegration were in fact

non-Turkish formations of only regimental strength and below. Erickson argues that
"Desertions occurred primarily during unit movements across the empire, during lulls in
action, and from hospitals in the rear areas.,,41 These desertions are emblematic of the
Kurdish and various Arab tribesmen who were often used by the empire to supplement its
lacking cavalry strength, men who generally only maintained an allegiance to money or
tribe. Military history of World War I has shown time and again that the Turkish military
strength consisted mainly of a strong defense and unwavering resol ve. The book

Caucasian Battlefields by Allen and Muratoffhas become one of the best known works
on the Eastern Anatolian campaigns from 1828 to 1921. The book regularly references

39

40
41

Erickson, Ordered to Die, 214
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the courage and "traditional stubbornness in defense," which characterizes the Turkish
ml'1'ltary. 42
The myth of desertion is linked to what has also been claimed as an unusually
high rate of casualty in the Ottoman Empire. The fact is, however, that many sources are
based on over estimated Russian sources and also do not account for loss due to the
elements such as disease, starvation and frostbite. According to Erickson, "The actual
combat related loss rate (l 0.6 percent) was similar to that of other combatants. Disease
was the great killer of men, particularly in Mesopotamia and in Caucasia.,,43 Eastern
Anatolia often witnessed the overly ambitious machinations of Enver Pa~a, Minister of
War in the Ottoman Empire. The grand plans of Enver Pa~a often required the Ottoman
military to perform incredible feats with very little support. One example is that of the
Sankaml~ campaign of 191444 , in which the military traversed hundreds of miles of brutal

mountain terrain with little food, equipment and clothing, resulting in the loss of around
75,000 men and most of their artillery, a substantial part of the Turkish III army,
according to Allen and Muratoff, among others. 45 According to Edward Erickson,
however, the number of casualties is closer to 50,000. 46 The Turkish III army was
comprised of the empire's seasoned battle veterans who did not require additional
training. They were the men who trained the others, a valuable resource within a military
stretched so thin. This debacle right at the outset of the war undoubtedly crippled the
Ottoman defense and preparation strategy even more than it had been already.
42 W.E.D AIIen, Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the TurcoCaucasian Border 1828-192, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953),39
43 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 215
44 This is an important aspect in reviewing Ottoman military history because the defeat at
Sankaml~ came just one year before the Annenian rebeIlion at Van, at a time when the Ottoman military
had already been stretched thin and resources, both materiaIly and in knowledge were in short supply.
45 AIIen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, 284
46 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 60
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The last myth refers to Enver Pa!?a and the plans of the CUP (Committee of Union
and Progress).47 The assumption is often that Enve:r Pa!?a and the CUP intended to regain
the land that had been lost during the previous wars in the Balkans and the land in the
East during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. This is based on the notion of PanTuranism, or the unification of Muslims throughout the Empire and elsewhere under a
common ethnic connection with the Ottoman Turks at the heart of the movement.
According to Erickson and others, the reality is that a massive Ottoman offensive in the
East was merely the result of timing and advantage in the wake of the Russian revolution
rather than a part of carefully formulated military strategy. Erickson argues that "This is
illustrated by the fact that the recovery of irredentist territory in Caucasia or in the former
Turkey-in-Europe never appeared in the prewar campaign planning process.,,48

Formation of the Ottoman Military and the Situation in the East
"Probably the greatest injustice done to this magnificent fighting army was the
gross distribution of its reputation, its ethos, and its character by erroneous historical
perceptions. ,,49
Prior to the 1860' s, the Ottoman Military had been constructed over the years in
such a way that it was more about loyalty to the Sultan than tactics and restructuring. Up
to this point in history, the Ottomans had been defeated by their European enemies again
and again with very little time in between to incorporate the much needed reforms that
were well overdue. At the time, there had existed a system of combating new problems
47 "The Young Turk movement attracted an unusual mix of Turks, including intelligentsia, liberal
thinkers, as well as numerous military and naval officers. The most prominent of these groups was the
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Naturally this movement was perceived as a threat to the
sultanate of Abdulhamit II, who sought to suppress it both inside and outside of his empire. The army
officers who secretly joined these groups maintained active cells in Damascus and Salonika."( See
Erickson, Ordered to Die, I)
48 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 214
49 Erickson, Ordered to Die, xix
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with old tactics. 50 It is also worth noting that the Ottomans could barely afford to pay
their soldiers after years of constant warfare and loss, let alone invest in artillery and
naval gunships. Fortunately, out of the Balkan wars of the nineteenth century, there
emerged a new corps of well trained officers within the Ottoman military structure which
"revitalized the army. ,,51 Prior to the reforms of th~: 1860' s, the glaring weakness of the
Ottoman military corps had been the incompetency of its officer corps with regard to
training and tactics. 52 Therefore, the Ottomans recognized an opportunity to invest in
their leadership instead. The defeat of the Ottomans in the East by General Peskevich and
the Russians, as well as the Egyptian Army of Mehmet Ali during the thirties, was at least
some indication that the Ottomans were the weakest on their Asiatic Frontiers. 53
Prussian prestige was beginning to replace that of the British. German advisors
began to replace British, Polish and Hungarian emigre officers which had carried over
after the Crimean War of 1853 _1856. 54 It was between the Crimean War and the 1877-78
Russo-Turkish War that the Ottoman reforms began to take effect in the military. New
officer school curriculums were developed to focus more on tactics than technical
training and theory. Unfortunately, even with the advancements in curriculum, the
Ottoman government ultimately could not afford the field training that was desperately
needed to train new recruits and new commanders. 55 Regardless, Ottoman success can be

Uyar and Erickson, A Military History a/the Ottomans, 203
Uyar and Erickson, A Military History a/the Ottomans, 175
52 Allen an d Muratoff, Caucasian Battlejield~, 113
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Allen and Muratoff, 109
54 Allen and Muratoff, III
55 Prior to the Ottoman losses in the Balkans, and according to general military standards, even as
they are today, it was preferable to utilize live fire exercises in battle training in order to provide the new
recruits with a closer understanding of war. However, the Ottoman government could not afford to spare
the money, time and supplies necessary to fulfill the live fire training exercises.
50
51
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directly linked to this new school of thought since the 1860's ultimately represented a
"renaissance of Ottoman military capacity. ,,56
Unfortunately for the Ottomans, the Officer corps was not enough to salvage their
lacking cavalry and manpower when compared to the Russians in the 1877-78 war. As
Erickson argues, the cavalry of the Ottomans was their main military weakness in every
action during the Russo-Turkish war. Poor cavalry meant an inability to match one's
enemy on the battlefield in an assault, an inability to protect your troops during a retreat
and also to pursue Russian forces in retreat after an Ottoman victory.57 The Turks, whose
defensive proficiency cannot be stressed enough, often fought from a fortified position in
Eastern Anatolia. Therefore, having defeated a Russian force attacking their position, it
would have been crucial to pursue them as they fled. Without cavalry this was not
feasible and would have been dangerous for Ottoman forces if they pursued on foot, not
only in weakening defenses but also risking vulnerability during a counter attack. This
helps to explain, in part, one major reason why the Ottomans were unable to defeat the
Russians.
The new Ottoman officer corps (Mekteblis, roughly "Academy Graduates")
remained an untapped resource during the Russo-Turkish war. Due to infighting and
distrust among the general staff of the Ottoman military hierarchy -- mainly fueled by
Sultan Abdulhamid II himself to maintain control of the throne -

"~:ach

group or division

commander saw his unit as his personal fiefdom and paid attention only to his immediate
area of operations. ,,58 The condition of the Ottoman general staff and military leadership
without a doubt resulted in the rise of the "Young Turks," who would later take control of
56
57
58

Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 175
Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 188
Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 194

-29-

the government and overthrow Sultan Abdulhamid II. The new guard of the officer corps
rivaled that of the old in their training. Therefore, the lack of cooperation among military
units in the interest of self preservation undoubtedly weakened the effectiveness of the
Ottoman military.
It was for this reason, coupled with reasons of poor equipment, fiscal strain and

minimal time to prepare for war that the Ottomans were left wanting on the Anatolian
front. In the Southern Caucasus and Eastern Anatolian regions along the Russian border,
repelling Russian attacks with so little was toilsome and back-breaking work. Ottoman
forces were stretched thin across a vast border in hellish terrain with little supply. Also, it
must be mentioned that due to the situation along the Russian border, which was a
reoccurring theme, the Ottomans also had to combat the problem of Kurdish raiders and
Armenian partisans.
Gendarmes, or the policemen of the Ottoman East, had generally been entrusted
with the protection and security of the people of the Empire in Anatolia. It was in the
interest of the Ottomans to protect their subjects for the purposes of tax collection. 59
During wartime, however, gendarmes would be called away to supplement the lacking
forces in the Ottoman military.6o In 1876, the population of the Ottoman Empire was
around 22 million people. Of these subjects, only about 16 million (12 million in Asia
and 4 million in Europe) were eligible for military service, due to the fact that the

59 Justin McCarthy et al. The Armenian Rebellion at Van, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah
Press, 2006), 37
60 Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922,
(Boston: Darwin Publishers, 1995),42
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Ottomans only allowed Muslims to serve in the regular army. This meant that the Turks
were perpetually outnumbered by the Russians 2: 1 at nearly every military engagement. 61
The lack of manpower dedicated to protection made Eastern Anatolia unique.
Religion had always been a factor in the Ottoman Empire and ultimately determined who
you were and where you lived rather than any kind of ethnic stratification. In the East,
the majority of the population was peasantry, attempting to make a living and provide fi)r
their families in harsh terrain. Affiliations were with one's religion and the same
conditions remained for the Kurds that also inhabited Eastern Anatolia. 62 Most
importantly, though, was the significance that religious denomination had regarding
loyalty and alliance. Due to their Christian affiliation with the Russian Orthodoxy and a
hatred oftheir Muslim overlords, Justin McCarthy argues that "During the 1700's and
1800' s, Armenian secular and religious officials supported the Russian invasion of the
Muslim Khanates in the Caucasus and the overthrow of their Muslim rulers," and that at
the same time, Armenians acted as spies for the Russians. 63 In terms of internal security
in the East, this is what the Ottomans were faced with among the many other problems
plaguing the empire by the end of the nineteenth century.
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64

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Heritage
"Similar to the French and British colonial experiences with low-intensity
conflicts or small wars, the Ottoman officers spent an important percentage of their
careers fighting against various types of insurgents, social bandits, and tribal warriors.
Their continuous occupation with counterinsurgency operations left its stamp on the
identity and performance of these officers. It is nearly impossible to understand the
political and military developments of the time without paying attention to this
counterinsurgency heritage. ,,65
Internal security threats were not unknown in the Ottoman Empire prior to the
First World War. Quite the opposite is true; they were experts in dealing with insurgency
64 McCarthy, Justin. Roads and Railroads [map] . Scale not given. In: Justin McCarthy. The
Armenian Rebellion at Van. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006, p. 168
65 Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 212
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both politically and militarily. As previously mentioned, the main concern of the Ottoman
government during the early and mid-nineteenth century was the constant threat of
Kurdish tribesmen who capitalized on turmoil through raids and highway robbery. The
Ottoman way had always been able to deal with them either by force with a show of
military might or with the occasional bribe. The average person was indifferent in the
East regarding rebellion and the same was true of the Kurds. There was no inherent
loyalty to one political ideology or another, the focus was mainly on religious affiliations.
Like most in the Eastern Anatolian region, they just wanted to be left alone. 66 According
to McCarthy, "Those who were a disruptive force were tribal groups, and their loyalties
were tribal... Iftribes cooperated, it was out of mutual benefit, not ethnic loyalty, for
which there is no evidence.,,67
It was no secret that upheaval in the East during wartime meant that the Ottomans

would have to respond and had the potential to weaken their abilities in battle as a whole.
That is why Kurdish tribes often capitalized on the chaos during wartime. Raiding and
theft were commonplace in the East, and the peasantry were often left to fend for
themselves when Ottoman forces were stretched too thin as they often were. Poor roads
and rough terrain also slowed the Ottoman response time to crises in the East and by the
time Ottoman forces would arrive it was often too late. In such situations, it is difficult to
imagine the emotional backlash of witnessing such atrocities for soldiers. That is
undoubtedly why the Turkish response was often harsh and exacting upon those believed
to be responsible.
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The Serbian rebellion of 1875 and the Bulgarian Revolution of 1876 in the West
is an example of how the Ottomans responded to rebellion in the Balkans, and also an
example of how such actions can influence others.. The Balkan region was a major source
of conflict and turmoil as well as a potential bargaining chip in the European balance of
power. The Serbian rebellion in Bosnia began with refusal to pay Ottoman taxes, leading
to attacks on officials and eventually Muslim villagers, which of course demanded a
response from the Ottoman military. The Turks responded with a force to quell the
rebellion led by Ahmet Muhtar Pasha. This gradually drew attention from the European
powers and ultimately increased an existing public outcry for the allowance of Bosnian
autonomy.
The Bulgarians, capitalizing on the situation in the West, saw an opportunity to
try for autonomy as well and began a revolution against the Empire in May of 1876. As
was seen later in the East, both rebellions had outside assistance from Montenegro and
Serbia who shipped arms and supplies, eventually entering the conflict directly. The
Serbian and Bulgarian rebels attacked civilians which were met in kind with Turkish
military force. The Ottomans eventually quelled the rebellions in Bosnia and Bulgaria
and defeated Serbia and Montenegro. 68 This victory inevitably led to the Russo-Turkish
war of 1877-78 and the consummate creation of a Bulgarian state. What became known
as the "Bulgarian Horrors" of 1876 had unquestionably begun with the slaughter of
innocent Muslims, though it was largely unreported.

69

The organizers of the Bulgarian revolution saw an opportunity to take advantage
of the Turkish vulnerability during the Bosnian revolt. The first villages to face the
68 Justin McCarthy, Population History of the Middle East and the Balkans, (Istanbul: The Isis
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revolutionary tide were Koprivshtitsa, Panagiurishte, and Klisura. 7o Thanks in part to the
rhetoric of the rebel leader of the Bulgarian revolution, named Georgi Benkovski, about
1,000 Muslim villagers were killed. Unfortunately, while the regular Turkish army had
been known for its restraint and obedience, the irregular forces were not. The regular
Turkish army was tied up with the Bosnian revolt and the Ottoman government feared
that the rebellion would quickly spread if not crushed immediately. Therefore, in order to
supplement the lacking troops, the Ottomans armed the indigenous Muslim civilians
(Ba~i

Bozuks) and Circassian irregulars which had been used many times before. These

irregulars were not known for their restraint, and as custom had dictated for centuries,
they obeyed the orders of their immediate tribal superiors rather than orders from the
Ottoman ml'1'1tary. 71

The Circassians particularly were accustomed to a nomadic style of warfare,
roaming in search of hospitable terrain and opposing those who opposed them, which
entailed raids and violent reprisal. Based on their experiences in the Caucasus fighting the
Russians, they had come to hate Christians for previous acts of violence against their
people and forcing them from their homeland. 72 Perhaps because of this tainted past
between the two groups, McCarthy suggests that the Bulgarian insurgents may have been
aware of the response they would receive from the Circassian irregulars, and that they
could potentially utilize such violent methods in their favor. McCarthy says that "By
always burning at least one Circassian village, they insured that th{! Circassians would
commit atrocities in reprisal. In areas of Bulgaria where the revolution took hold, the
insurgents committed acts of violence, particularly against Muslim women, with the
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obvious intent of sparking a retaliation.,,73 This is important to remember because the
Circassians were a source of Ottoman irregular forces.
The idea of utilizing the suffering of others for the greater good in terms of social
revolution and autonomy from the Ottoman Empire may seem like a cold and unfeasible
solution for the Bulgarians. However, the awareness of Western media and Western
support for their actions against their Muslim oppressors was well known by the
Bulgarians, recognizing that the eyes of the Christian nations of Europe were upon them.
One such example is when the English press ran stories about the atrocities of the Turks
and the kidnapping of Christian girls who were later sold into slavery in Turkish
harems. 74 There was no truth to the story whatsoever, proven later by European consuls,
but stories like this had a profound effect on the Western psyche. The Armenians would
later attribute their revolutionary aims to be that of the Bulgarians by which they would
draw attention to their struggle, committing atrociities against Muslims with the intent of
generating Armenian slaughter as a result. The idea being, just as had happened
previously in the Balkans, Europe would intervene on their behalf and create an
Armenian nation just as the Bulgarians had received. 75
Muslim suffering did not end with an Ottoman victory over the Bulgarians. The
result was a Russian invasion in the West and the subsequent murder of countless Muslim
villagers at the hands of Russian troops and Bulgarian irregulars who sided with Russia.
As previously stated, the Ottomans were not the only ones to use unconventional tactics
to achieve military aims. The Russian method consisted of sending their most feared and
most skilled units in unconventional warfare known as the Cossacks. In order to create a
73
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Bulgarian state and to insure Russian supremacy in the region, it had to be Muslim free; a
task which was entrusted to the Cossack units sent to the region. As McCarthy says,
"What was needed was a combination of murder and fear that would either kill the
Muslims outright or cause them to flee from impending murder. To accomplish this, the
most suitable force in the Russian army was the Cossacks.,,76
Russian and Bulgarian terror campaigns were meant to frighten, displace and
eliminate Muslim opposition as well as the Muslim population as a whole. By disarming
Bulgarian Muslims and turning their weapons over to Bulgarian Christians siding with
Russia, the object was to destroy their homes so they had nothing to return to when
hostilities ended.
"For Example, in the village of Hidibey, Cossacks peacefully took the arms of the
Turkish villagers and gave them to the Bulgarians, who then killed all but 15 of the 70
Turkish males of the village, while the Cossacks made sure that none escaped. The 15
who did escape had fled as soon as the Russians were sighted. In the Buklumluk, the
Cossacks again took the Turk's weapons and gave them to the Bulgarians. The Cossacks
'cordoned off the town' to prevent escape. The Bulgarians put all the men in a straw barn
and all the women and children in houses. The barn and the houses were piled with straw
and set afire. Those who ran from the buildings were shot by the Bulgarians.,,77
It is unlikely that there was any real strategic value to such attacks on civilians within the

mindset of Russian and Bulgarian soldiers. The violence of the 1877-78 war was
undoubtedly carried over in the collective mindset for the atrocities on both sides during
the 1876 revolt. Instructions for soldiers on how to incite rage and hatred would have
been highly unlikely. Rather, the differences were primarily religious and the men who
faced the horrors of war would not have forgotten what had happened to their families
and countrymen on both sides of the conflict. Unfortunately, it was primarily the civilians
who suffered during the war, as they generally do in all wars; the result of which is a
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deep, enduring hatred for one's enemy. This is not only remembered by the soldiers of
the conflict itself, but also a lesson taught to the children who survive to be acted upon in
the future.

Preparations for War and the Threat of an Armenian Fifth Column
"In guerrilla units some individuals have developed strong ideological motives for
taking up arms. These ideologies take root in two broad areas - politics and religion. The
individual tends to subordinate his own personality to these ideologies and works
constantly and solely for the 'cause.' In some resistance fighters, this motive is extremely
strong.,,7!!
The lessons that the Turks had learned from the Balkans and the Russo-Turkish
war of 1877 -78 was that a European style time-table was "unsuitable" for future combat
due to poor communication lines. Also, the immense setbacks suffered in previous wars
had an even greater impact with regard to losses of equipment, trained leaders and
experienced battle formations. The loss of the entire Second Army (12 regular infantry
divisions) in 1914 and most of the First Army meant that focus would have to be on the
reconstitution of forces rather than training. This made the German mission to assist the
Turks in restructuring all the more difficult. Wher,e the Turks and Germans could have
planned for successful offensive operations, had the military been in better standing, they
now had to focus primarily on reconstitution and hope for the opportunity to seek an
effective offensive strategy.79
Keeping this in mind, it also meant that throughout the plarming prior to W orId
War I, the Young Turks were more concerned with restructuring and diplomacy rather
than internal security. Erickson argues that "because of the Young Turks' propensity to
78 Department of the Army. u.s. Army Guerrilla Warfare Handbook, C~ew York: Skyhorse
Publishing Inc., 2009), 6
79 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 23
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conduct diplomacy (and their affairs in general) in isolation, that at any given time
between August and November of 1914, no single individual within the Turkish
government (including either Sait Halim, the Grand Vizier, or Enver Pa~>a, the Minister of
War) had a global awareness of the entire diplomatic situation affecting the empire."so
Perhaps in spite of this, the Turks did not fully realize the potential threat of the
Armenians in the East. Leading up to the war, the CUP had tried to appease the leading
Armenian party in the East in order to prevent any kind of popular uprising that might
threaten the empire during wartime. sl At the begirming of World War I, the concentration
of Russian forces was in the West fighting the Austrians and Germans. Therefore, in the
East, in the Caucasus, they only needed to hold out against the Turks until they could be
spared reinforcements. In the meantime, it was as the Ottomans had done before, the
Russians now had to defend the lines in the Caucasus.
Enver Pa!?a realized this and must have seen it as an opportunity to break the
Russians in the East before the war gained momentum. The old European concept of
perpetual offensive attack was undoubtedly a factor in his military stratagem. Among his
grandiose inventions was a debacle known as the "Grand Turanian Offensive." In
December of 1914, Enver envisioned an opportunity to break the Russians in the East,
gaining a foothold for the rest of the war in Anatolia. His plan was to attack a railway in
Sankaml!? which was reinforced with a small Russian force by attacking through the
mountains and surprising the Russians. The Russians were indeed surprised because,
given the weather conditions and the difficulty of the assault, the mission was essentially
suicide. Allen and Muratoff argue that the plan had no real chance of success. The plan
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needed more men and more time to prepare but Enver did not want to allow such an
opportunity to slip away.82 Though, even with an abundance of time and troops, an
offensive during the winter months was destined to fail.
The fighting for

Sankaml~

throughout January of 1915 resulted in the loss of

about 50,000 soldiers from the Turkish III Army and most of their artillery. The Russian
losses were about 16,000 killed and wounded with roughly 12,000 sick - mostly from
frostbite. 83 Enver tried to cover up the losses at Sankaml~ but the damage was already
done. The Turkish forces now had to be recovered and the army restructured to fulfill
regimental requirements. The Turks fortunately had the reserves of men available but
were severely deficient in weapons and ammunition. The Turks soon caught wind of a
potential allied invasion of the Dardanelles and their focus began to shift from the East to
their defenses in the West. 84
The offensive of Enver Pa~a and subsequent failure at

Sarlkaml~

ended any

chance of an Ottoman offensive against the Russians for at least two years. Though, the
3rd Army had begun with their overall effective troop strength at about 118,174 in
December of 1914, only 8,900 remained after Sankaml~.85 The Turks had become
significantly weakened in the defense of Eastern Anatolia and afforded revolutionary
Armenian elements to flourish virtually unabated. Anatolia was a core region in the
defense of the empire and with Ottoman presence lacking in the east, the Russians were
able to capitalize on faltering Ottoman intelligence and logistics by supporting an already
hostile Armenian environment in Van.
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Border Security and Armenian Operations
Armenian discontent and revolutionary organization can be traced back as early
as the 1870's. Erickson argues that "While many of the Armenians were loyal and law
abiding citizens of the empire there had existed for many years subversive Armenian
societies dedicated to the establishment of an autonomous Armenia.,,86 Two parties in
particular sowed the seeds of rebellion from within which were known as The Union of
Salvation (founded in 1872) and the Black Cross Society (founded in 1878). The
inception of these parties is not as important as their influence on those to follow. They
were proof that revolutionary organizations were able to function effectively and
efficiently with minimal Ottoman opposition. They were also proof that with proper
leadership, rebellion could flourish while preaching violent revolution. Though these two
groups did not perform revolutionary acts, they were undoubtedly the inspiration for
those that did. Among the groups to follow were the Armenakan Party (founded 1885),
the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party (founded in 1887) and the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (ARF or Dashnaks founded in 1890).87
Within the Ottoman documents titled Ar$iv Belgeleriyle $iirlerini Faaliyetleri
1914-1918 CUt I (Armenian Activities in the Archive Documents 1914-1918 Volume 1),

there are nearly fifty pages of "interviews" conducted from May 4 to May 12, 1915. The
"interviews", conducted by the Second Police Chief Ahmet LUtfi, were gathered from
various members of the Hunchak and Dashnak Armenian parties in an attempt to
understand the leadership hierarchy of the organizations in various districts and villages
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throughout Anatolia. The "interviews" place emphasis on party affiliation and board
members identities in order to uncover the extent of the Armenian revolutionary network.
Chief LUtfi asked questions such as: "Who were the members and the administrators of
your committee? Please tell us their names ... Where did you hide your association's
weapons, arsenal? ... Where are the documents and the registry books of the
association?,,88 These "interviews," though they would more likely be categorized as
interrogations, are at least some indication of the threat posed by the two major Armenian
revolutionary groups. They also portray the Ottoman Empires' concern with the identities
of their leaders and the location of their weapons caches. From a counterinsurgency
perspective, the Ottomans most certainly placed the gathering of intelligence on insurgent
activity at the top of their list.
The Dashnaks, who were to become the most influential revolutionary group of
the insurgency, were socialists in their ideology, much like the Hunchaks. They drew
inspiration for armed insurrection from Marxism and preached the necessity of arming a
civilian population in order to achieve "political and economic liberty in Turkish
Armenia" through such means. 89 It was believed by the Armenian revolutionaries that
through sabotage missions, the execution of goveInment officials and Armenian
"traitors" who were unsympathetic to their cause, they would gain recognition and
ultimately autonomy.90 Human suffering was unavoidable and it was necessary to
mobilize the population in favor of a popular revolt if they were to succeed, not to
mention generating European support in the process.

88 Turkey, General Staff Command, Ar$iv Belgeleriyle $iirlerini Faaliyetleri 1914-1918 Cilt I,
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In discussing the revolution with Dr. Hamlin, founder of Robert College,91 one of
the revolutionaries told Hamlin that Hunchak bands would "watch their opportunity to
kill Turks and Kurds, set fire to their villages, and then make their escape into the
mountains. The enraged Moslems will then rise, and fall upon the defenseless Armenians
and slaughter them with such barbarity that Russia will intervene in the name of
humanity and Christian civilization." When Hamlin vehemently opposed the plan and its
"atrocious" nature, the revolutionary responded: ,,·It appears so to you, no doubt; but we
Armenians have determined to be free. Europe listened to the Bulgarian Horrors and
made the Bulgarians free. She will listen to our cry when it goes up in the shrieks and
blood of millions of women and children ... we are: desperate, we shall do it. ,,92
Most likely, the reason for such extreme measures was an attempt to draw others
to their cause within the community through a demonstration of power. It is also a clear
example of terrorist strategy in practice. Regarding security in a guerrilla insurgency
operation:
"If the resistance movement is strong or gives the impression of being powerful, many
individuals join out of a feeling of personal safety. Usually, this situation occurs only
after the resistance movement is well organized and the enemy has been weakened by
other actions. Others join in order to escape recruitment into the service of the enemy. ,,93
Security from vengeful Ottoman troops would be powerful motivation if one were
anticipating reprisal for what others had done. Also, after the Balkan wars, the new
leadership in the Ottoman military enforced conscription regulations of non-Muslims,
91 Robert College was perhaps the greatest examplt: of Western Missionary influence in the
Ottoman Empire. It was founded in the 1860's in Constantinople, and was intended to offer a higher level
of education to the indigenous population as opposed to the basic teachings and introduction of Western
ideas in the existing elementary schools. Enrollment heavily increased with a wider range of academia such
as science, theology, morality, mathematics and languages. However, the employment ofthe printing press
was perhaps the most influential in disseminating Western concepts abroad. (See Robert L. Daniel,
American Philanthropy in the Near East [Athens: Ohio University Press, 1970], 71-73)
92 McCarthy, Death and Exile, 118
93 Department of the Army, Guerrilla Warfare Handbook, 7

-43··

recognizing the danger of a Russian invasion. Among these newly drafted soldiers were
Armenians who had already been exposed to revolutionary propaganda. Most of these
recruits can be linked to the high desertion rate in the Ottoman military, as Uyar and
Erickson argue that "very few of them were willing to fight and risk their lives for the
sake of the empire. As could be expected, the desertion rates of non-Muslim recruits set
record highs. They fled or surrendered at the first opportunity, which verified the
suspicions that Muslim soldiers held towards thern.,,94 Their flight from the Ottoman
ranks undoubtedly supplied the Armenian weapons caches that would later be discovered
by the Turks.
European pressure had perhaps been the most damaging to the Ottoman
counterinsurgency efforts. Proven effective previously in the Balkans, fighting insurgents
meant also punishing those responsible for their support. 95 This could not be achieved
while Europeans continued to slant the news in favor of their downtrodden Christian
Armenian brethren in the East. Ironically enough, McCarthy points out that "The same
Europeans who complained bitterly whenever the Ottomans imprisoned Armenian rebels
voiced constant complaints that the Ottomans were not forceful enough in dealing with
the Kurdish tribes.,,96 Perhaps their sympathies were only limited to members ofa
congregation.
Indeed it was no secret that there was Christian support for the Armenian rebel
cause. According to the Ottoman government documents, there was in fact an order
issued on May 23, 1915 detailing the procedures in handling "Christians who are allies of
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the enemy and Muslims who collaborate with them.',97 The order was essentially a call
for the investigation of Christians suspected of supporting the Armenian revolutionaries
and for their homes to be searched. Those found to be guilty of supporting the Armenian
revolutionaries were to be punished by court martial.
For over a decade prior to World War [the Ottomans had also been forced to
practice a cautious approach to opposition in the East regarding Kurdish tribes, who had
formerly been the empire's greatest internal irritation in Eastern Anatolia. Although the
Kurdish tribes proved an annoyance in the past, their skills in battle and the use of their
cavalry in irregular formations was an important aspect of Ottoman defense in the region.
What was ultimately required at the time in the East was a larger police force or

Gendarmerie, which the Ottomans could not span!. What was used in their place became
a mistake that the Armenians would not soon forget. Sultan Abdulhamit II created the
Hamidiye, an irregular Kurdish force intended to solve the military's security problem in
the East in 1890, a group whose application played a significant role in stopping the
Armenian rebellion of 1896. 98
Whereas, the Armenian revolutionaries had sometimes cooperated in the
rebellions of the 1890's, their failures led to splintering among the parties. Specifically, a
division had developed between the two strongest parties - the Dashnaks and the
Hunchaks - in which case the responsibility of leadership was ultimately thrust upon the
Dashnaks. 99 Erickson argues that "By 1914, nationalist/revolutionary Armenian societies
were operating openly in Europe and in Russia and were receiving support from many
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sources that sought the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire." 100 Ottoman power had
virtually ended in Europe with their defeat in the Balkan wars and the Armenian
revolutionary organizations would have been able to conduct subversive planning without
interruption.
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Armenians had established four
local committees in Turkey. They had a base in

Mu~;

propaganda and finance was

handled through their bases at Trabazon and Erzerurn, while their main headquarters
were in Van. 102 These bases that they had established acted as the backbone of the
revolutionary network in crucial areas that would later be able to facilitate a Russian
invasion. Their propaganda and fundraising efforts were perhaps the most overt, using
reeducation in local schools, assassination and threats to encourage rich Armenians to
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donate to the cause. ]03 McCarthy argues that "Many hated the revolutionaries and would
have informed on their organization and weapons caches if they had not been afraid for
their lives.,,]04
Some Armenian committees, however, were afraid of the growing interest within
the CUP for "Pan Turanism," which advocated the imposition of the Turkish language
and culture on the subjects of the empire. The idea was a veracious Turkish nationalist
pride that was intended to bring the Turkic world together under one banner facing heavy
opposition from Europe. Erickson says that "In the Spring of 1914 the Turks intercepted
letters from Armenian committees expressing concern over these developments. Other
letters sent by the Dashnak [Tashnak] committee requested weapons from the
Russians.,,]05 The Russians did indeed send weapons and obviously expected Armenian
acquiescence and assistance in the event of an Anatolian invasion. The Armenian
committees would have been well aware of this fact, therefore any argument of selfdefense alone would be erroneous.
In a document from the Turkish archives known as the "Instructions for Personal
Defense" dated 1910, the Armenian revolutionari~:s illustrate their aims on a village by
village basis. According to the Ottomans, "tens of thousands" of copies were distributed.
The document plainly states that there are three types of villages: "1) Those situated
between other Armenian villages and exclusively inhabited by Armenians; 2) Those
situated in non-Armenian zones, but nevertheless exclusively inhabited by Armenians;
and 3) Those inhabited at the same time by Armenians and non-Armenians." Regardless
of these distinctions, there was no difference in the organization of defense. The
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document calls for the organization of detachments within each village comprised of two
sections within each detachment - a "stationary force" and an "active force." In the
"mixed" villages, the document calls for any enemies which might be the minority in
relation to Armenians, to be "kept as hostages." In the last section of the document titled
"To Attack Villages," there are several simple steps which must be adhered to in order to
create the ideal conditions for attacking and overtaking an "enemy" village. Generalities
apply in terms of basic guerrilla warfare such as having adequate intelligence, selecting a
line of retreat, knowing the directional approach of enemy reinforcements should they
come, attacking at dawn to maximize confusion and finally leaving any horses available
that are not being used for mounted attacks to transport any casualties. 106 It is the fourth
point, however, which is particularly interesting and deserves to be quoted directly:
To attack the village only on three sides, leaving a side free for the besieged to
make good their escape. (if the village is attacked on all sides, the enemy may fight with
desperation and compromise victory.) However, on the side left free, a section of
attackers must conceal themselves in order to pursue the enemy and cause him as much
damage as possible. Furthermore, the object of leaving a side free is, rather than favor the
retreat of the enemy, to break up his force of resistance and thus hasten victory; 107
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By the spring of 1914, the Armenian revolutionaries had already established
intricate smuggling lines from Russia. Thanks to the Russian victory in the 1877-78 war
against the Turks, the Russians had forced the Ottomans back from the previous
territorial boundaries which ran along the Southern Caucus Mountains. Also, the Russian
incursion into Northwestern Iran facilitated the perfect means for smuggling weapons
from Russia directly into Ottoman territory and taking them to Van where the Armenian
revolutionaries were conspiring with regular Russian forces. The Ottomans, realizing the
growing threat of an Armenian revolt, patrolled their borders with Russia and Iran to
108 McCarthy, Justin . Armenian Rebel Smuggling Routes [map] . Scale not given. Ln: Justin
McCarthy. The Armenian Rebellion at Van. Salt Lake City : The University of Utah Press, 2006, p. 94.
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prevent such activities. In response, the Armenians used villagers and spies as their eyes
and ears to report on troop patrols as well as Kurdish tribal movements. The use of
Armenian spy networks is confirmed by an Ottoman 3rd Army report to Turkish
Commanders saying that "It is understood that tht:y (Dashnaks) have set up espionage
centers in Trabzon, Erzurum,

Mu~,

Bitlis, Van, Sivas, and in Kayseri in order to inform

the Russian Army about the movement and state of the Turkish Army."I09 Once across
the border with the weapons caches, the rebels would disguise themselves as Kurdish
tribesmen and then village hop the weapons to their intended destination. 110
Stockpiling continued as the Dashnak party grew stronger in the region bordering
Russia and Iran. At the edge of the empire in the East, weapons were being gathered and
Russian forces were training irregular fighters in preparation for a Russian invasion. III
From December of 1914 to March of 1915, the Armenian bands had begun to form
themselves into regular units and were softening up the Ottomans for a Russian invasion.
The rebels would disarm and overwhelm Muslim villages killing men, women and
children indiscriminately, including Gendarmerie and soldiers. Most of the trouble was in
Bitlis and Van, but by then, most of the eastern Anatolian countryside was at war and the
Armenians were under Russian leadership. The war became one of Muslim and
Armenian conflict, attack and counter attack, violence and revengt: which was sparked by
Armenians and exacted later by Muslims. I12
As early as September of 1914, there had been reports of Armenian decent and
concerns over the situation in the East as the situation grew more intense. One such report
109 Turkey, General Staff Command, Ar$iv Belgeleriyle #irlerini Faalzvetleri 1914-1918 eilt I,
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submitted by a police officer investigating the Bozviran village of Pasinler, just 25 miles
East of Erzerum, wrote in a report:
I have officially and unofficially had [sic] heard, when I was in Russia, that the
Russian government was relying heavily on the Armenians for the solution of both the
eastern provinces problem and for the solution of the minor upheavals in the Caucasus;
and that the Russian government was trying to pull the Armenians on her side to incite
upheavals and turmoil in the eastern provinces, Eastern Anatolia, whenever she wanted,
with the aim of putting the pressure on our government by interfering with our internal
affairs. I have also heard recently, in Petersburg, that the Russians's [sic] investing so
much money for the realization of this goal has urged the Annenians living in our
country to join the Armenians on the other side of the border who were already impelled
by the Russians's [sic] behavior. Hence, I find the reports presented by the police
extremely worthy of consideration; moreover, it can be asserted, without doubt, that most
of the Armenians living in the eastern provinces are full of same [sic] desire and
feeling. I 13

The Van Insurgency and the Ottoman Response
Having realized the full extent of the rebellion in the East, the Ottoman military
tried to enforce the empire's policies. As previously mentioned, because of the lacking
Gendarmerie in the region, there remained insufficient manpower to maintain a more
stringent military code of conduct. The British and Russian offensives had drained nearly
all regular Turkish forces and allocated them to the front lines, located in Eastern
Europe. I 14 In April of 1915, Governor Cevat of Van, thinking that he could end the
rebellion quickly, ordered the arrest of the leading members of the Dashnak party,
assuming perhaps that he would fragment the revolt by removing its leadership. Ishkan,
one of the more prominent leaders, left Van and was killed shortly after. Vramian, an
effective party organizer in America, was arrested and "disappeared" before he reached
Bitlis while under Ottoman guard. The leader, Aram Manukian, evaded Ottoman forces
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and escaped. By the end of the month, an all out Armenian insurrection had begun with
forces cutting telegraph lines and continuing to attack military personnel and civilians. I IS
McCarthy notes the importance of the fact that Armenian actions in preparation
for the rebellion at Van had been made as early as October of 1914. This would indicate
that based on Armenian Defense Council correspondence, the insurgency in Van had
already been planning and preparing for war against regular Ottoman forces under the
pretext of provocation. Haig Gossoian (Gassoyan) wrote ofthe Armenian preparations
for war in Van under the leadership of the Armeni:an Defense Council. Gossoian
recounted the preparations for a rebellion in Van by issuing a virtual "how to" guide to
rural insurgency, months before the escalation of conflict in the region. Gossoian wrote:
In consultation with higher authorities, this council was able to complete essential
tasks, such as, (a) registration of arms, preparation of arms caches and procurement of
firearms, (b) registration of men fit for and capable of combat duty, appointment of
defense leaders, reconditioning of arms, (c) creation of first aid and hospital facilities, and
procurement of drugs, (d) and a provisioning committee, to be activated as soon as
demand required. 116

A document from the Ottoman archives dated September 13,1914, describes the
information obtained during interrogations from s,everal villages surrounding Erzurum.
The document describes information that Loris MaIko (Melikov), the son of a Russian
General, had left for Van to incite uprisings. He had apparently been ordered "not to
incite an uprising unless the Ottoman Army attacks [sic] Russia." The information
continues saying that the Armenians of Van were instructed, "should the Ottoman Army
declares [sic] war upon Russia, as usual, you are to incite an uprising; and if you enroll in
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the anny, only one-third of you should join, and do not take part in the attacks against
Russia."] ]7
Throughout April, the rebels paved the way for a Russian invasion into eastern
Anatolia via Van, battling Kurdish irregulars who had been sent to fight. Where the
Turkish government under the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) had once
attempted to negotiate with the Annenian revolutionary communities as a preventative
measure, by the spring those methods proved "ineffective.,,]]8 It was for this reason that
the Ottoman government had initially attempted to relocate" ... some Annenians who
posed a threat," to Konya. This initial attempt at £orced relocation in the east, however,
proved ineffective as well because, according to Ottoman documents, these relocated
Annenians believed to be a threat, soon joined with other revolutionary bands in the
region southeast of Aleppo.]]9
In February of 1915, the Supreme Military Command of the Ottoman government
circulated a warning to all units that Annenians were fonning bands in various areas. The
warning also said that Armenians were:
" ... deserting from the army engaging in banditry, that large amounts of weapons
and bombs had been found during searches, that these indicated that they were preparing
for a rebellion and that to counter this threat the following measures were to be
implemented: Annenian privates will not be employed in the mobile army and in the
anned services, commanders will resist armed attacks, when necessary, they will declare
martial law, a vigilant watch will be kept everywhere, searches will not be conducted in
areas where there is no planned operation and loyal subjects will not be hanned in any
,,120
way.
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As early as December of 1914, the Armenian rebels had been organizing themselves into
bands along the Iranian border and various other places along the Ottoman border with
Russia. Their command structure overall was one concentrated "loosely under Russian
command.,,121 Throughout December, the Armenians approached from Iran with Russian
support, while irregular bands were engaging in skirmishes and smaller battles with
Ottoman forces. The main aim of the Armenian rebel bands was to cut the telegraph lines
in order to prevent the Turks from maintaining effective communications with central
command. Realizing this, Tahsin Bey, Governor of Erzerum, reported that there was a
revolt within Van and other areas, and requested reinforcements to be sent. 122
According to Ottoman documents, on April 24, 1915, a note from the Office of
the Prime Minister to the Office of the

Commandl~r-in-Chiefwas

sent detailing the

appropriate actions to be taken in dealing with the: uprising. The note stipulates that due
to the activities of the Hunchak and Dashnak committee efforts, regions such as Zeytun,
Bitlis, Sivas and Van were all posturing for revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The
document continues saying that,
With the discovery of bombs, and the Ottoman Armenians' joining with the
Russian forces by forming voluntary regiments against the Ottoman State, it has become
evident that these committees ... have gathered .. .in order to incite upheavals in the
regions behind and to threat [sic] the Ottoman Army at every opportunity through their
attempts, organizations, and publications. 123

In light of these allegations, the note details the means by which the government intended
to quell the rebellion by stating that they intended to close down the Hunchak and
Dashnak branches in both the capital and in various other provinc(~s, seize any pertinent
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documents, and arrest the committee leaders and members which had taken part in the
activities. 124 Due to previous attempts at appeasement, the gendannerie and village police
would have been well aware of who the members were and would have had no trouble
identifying those believed to be responsible.
In March of 1915, most of the eastern Anatolian countryside was in tunnoil and
the fighting in Van province had intensified. The <coming of spring meant the melting of
snow and the opening of passes which would have previously hindered the Russian and
Annenian volunteer advance from the Caucasus. McCarthy argues that perhaps the
discovery of rebel plans by the Ottoman government may have hastened their pre-war
planning process. 125 This seems to be true because from a strategic: standpoint, it would
have made more sense for the Annenians to strike: the city of Van while they were
preoccupied with defense from a Russian invasion rather than try to take it themselves
using smaller bands. Rebel attacks had begun with cutting telegraph lines, a tactic which
they had been using regularly as a guerrilla maneuver to create chaos and prevent
reinforcements in the region. By March, however, they had grown bolder, attacking
military installations and gendannes in the Annenian districts ofVan. 126 (:atak Kaza,
(meaning "district"), was the site of the initial Armenian resistanct::, located in the
southern area of Van.
Based on the investigations and interrogations of the gendannerie, and the
intelligence reports of the Ottoman 3rd Anny in eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman command
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was well aware of the situation in Van. A coded report to the Ottoman General
Headquarters states that,
As it was presented in the telegrams dated April 20 and 21 (1915), it has been
decided that, without hurting the feeling of the people who obeyed the state, by making
use of all the people who can be of help and by calling the men between the ages of 46
and 50 in military service, all the traitors who took ups arms against the state will be
punished without showing mercy. If you would approve, I here by [sic] ask the conveying
above-mentioned point to the Armenian Patriarch, who is charged with the duty of
educating the people who go astray, and thus inspire the Armenians to obedience and
loyalty to the state under his own leadership, rather than increasing the effects of the
erroneous news of the traitor informers. 127

It is essentially the issuance of a formal warning to be delivered to the Armenian

community through the Armenian Patriarch. It is a warning meant to avoid the
punishment of innocent people by proxy to the conflict in eastern Anatolia. A few days
later (April 24, 1915), according to British Military Records, 1800 Armenians were
detained by the Ottoman government trom both the Hunchak and Dashnak parties as well
as various other rebel volunteers. 128
By May, when a mountain gun unit of the 28 th infantry and Mobile Gendarmerie
battalions from Erzincan and Erzurum did arrive to reinforce the Ottoman forces, it was
too late; the rebels had already gained a foothold in the region. The reinforcements did,
however, manage to secure the only escape route toward Bitlis. 129 Fighting continued,
coordinated with Russian forces and on May 16-1 7, the remaining troops and civilians
left the city. 130 Aram Manukian was named governor of Van two days after the Russians
entered the city on May 20, 1915, and the "Van Province Armenian Government" was
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established. 131 Forces sent to Van to quell the uprising were desperately needed to the
East of the city to stop a Russian advance from the Caucasus, ultimately allowing rebel
reinforcements to arrive and forcing the Ottomans out of Van. 132 A media report of the
Armenian victory at Van was published in the United States in Gochnak, an Armenian
newspaper, which reported four days later, that only 1,600 Turks still remained in Van
and that the rest had been expelled or slaughtered. 133 Just one day after the Russians
entered the City of Van, the Armenian revolutionary committee of Van received a
telegram from Tsar Nicholas thanking them for their services to Russia.
The decision to evacuate the Armenian population was issued on May 26 by the
Ottoman High Command to the Ministry of the Interior. It was suggested that all
Armenians from the eastern provinces should be e:vacuated and also from similar places
in Anatolia where Armenians were concentrated. The plan had been to move the
Armenian communities further into the interior of the empire in order to eradicate
subversive opposition from key strategic areas of Ottoman control.. With three key points
in mind regarding Armenian relocation, the Ottoman government made the decision to
move the Armenians of Anatolia over 240 miles west of Van to an area south of
Diyarbaklf, near what is now the Syrian border. The three points were as follows: "1. the
Armenian population should not exceed 10 percent of the tribes and Muslims in the area
they were being relocated to; 2. Each of the

villagl~s

which the relocated Armenians

would establish should not consist of more than 50 houses; and 3. The evacuated
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Armenians should not be allowed to change their places of abode.",134 This was obviously
a concerted effort by the Ottoman government to prevent those forcibly relocated
Armenians from causing any further trouble in their new homes. As stipulated by the
directions for relocation, any disturbance would not have gone unnoticed.
As will be seen in the following chapter on the British in South Africa and the
Americans in the Philippines, there were criminal acts committed in quelling insurgency
at the military level. Talat

Pa~a

wrote in his memoirs of this saying that those people who

did take advantage ofthe situation were both "immoral" and "unscrupulous." In dealing
out policy among the various political and military branches of the government, the
Ottoman high command did issue contradicting orders which were perhaps confusing for
some commanders. On the one hand they were ordered at the political level to "take the
necessary measures" and at the military level they were ordered to "punish those who
were responsible" while also being expected to protect the people. 135 The issue of
Armenian mistreatment in the forced relocations remains a hotly debated subject in
Anatolian academia. Some claim that the Armenians were intentionally withdrawn from
the east in an attempt to eradicate them by starvation and exhaustion through their
grueling trek west, away from the battles. Research of the Ottoman archives, however,
reveals that Talat

Pa~a

himself signed orders stating that any officials found neglecting

their duties and any civilian assailants were to be sent to Committees of Investigation and
. 11aw tn'buna.I 136
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According to Yusuf Hala~oglu, the Armenian delegation at the Paris Peace talks
observed that there were as many as 180,000 Amlenian volunteers who fought with the
Russians from1914 to 1917. Hala~oglu continues saying, "German intelligence
documents ... state that as of February 1915, the French armed forces included a total of
12,466 Armenians, of whom 592 were Ottoman Armenians and 12,466 were Armenians
from other countries.,,137 If claims such as this admitted to Armenian involvement in the
Russian fight against the Ottoman Empire, then the threat from invasion was very
substantial indeed. This figure also underestimates the number of Ottoman Armenians by
not counting irregulars, a number that surely would have been much higher.
The Ottoman government took care in allowing the Armenians being forcibly
relocated to bring whatever provisions they needed along with them. As the Armenians
were relocated from areas of concern such as Van, Bitlis, Erzurum, Aleppo and Adana,
the Ottomans also issued orders that the relocated villagers were to be counted and
tracked from their point of origin to the village they were being relocated to.138 This was
done with the intention of allowing Armenians to return to their homes at war's end,
otherwise the entire process seems costly and redundant. On securing the civilian
population, the current U.S. coalition counterinsurgency doctrine states:
The field manual directs U.S . forces to make securing the civilian, rather than
destroying the enemy, their top priority. The civilian population is the center of gravity the deciding factor in the struggle. Therefore, civilians must be separated from insurgents
to insulate them from insurgent pressure and to deny the insurgent 'fish' the cover of the
civilian 'sea'. B~ doing so, counterinsurgents can militarily isolate, weaken, and defeat
the insurgents. 13
137 Yusuf Hala~oglu, The Story of 1915: What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?, (Ankara:
The Turkish Historical Society, 2008), 32-33
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From a strategic standpoint, the relocation of a potential insurgent force was more
than a difficult decision; it was believed to be a tactical necessity. It would have been
literally impossible for the Ottomans, or any other military force then and now, to tell an
insurgent from a civilian at a glance. Age and gender are obvious indications of insurgent
potential but that designation can only be very generally applied to soldiers. It does not
account for insurgent support bases that can be found within a civilian population.
Therefore, in order to remove an imperceptible threat from a sea of indistinguishable
enemies the only alternative was to drain the sea to remove the threat; a suggestion which
was apparently at the behest of German advisement. 140 Given the state of the Ottoman
Empire at the time, their struggle was not one of colliding titans. Theirs was a struggle of
survival, for the continuity of the empire. It was also a proven measure which had been
used by their British and American counterparts over a decade earlier which will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Halayoglu argues that if one is to accept the estimates of Annenian losses in
Anatolia, Syria and the Caucasus, then casualties "'would have been around 250,000 to
300,000." He also argues, however, that most of these deaths were the result of
epidemics, which in other European countries of the same time period, were also very
high - a problem which also plagued the Filipino community over a decade earlier,
following the civilian relocation efforts of American forces. According to Halayoglu's
calculations, from 1918-1920, Britain had an estimated 167,805 deaths, France had an
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estimated 137,173 deaths, and Germany had an estimated 247,983 deaths - all of which
. re Iate d . 141
were epl'demlC
The Turks have received the most criticism for the Armenian death rate during
this period because of their decision to relocate large numbers of the Armenian
community for reasons of security. Critics draw their arguments from demographic
figures which also happen to be in the areas of greatest contention in the east from
Armenian rebels: Erzurum, Bitlis and Van. According to McCarthy, perhaps the greatest
argument for the survival of Armenians in this region is also demographic, mainly from
the number of Erzurum refugees. McCarthy says that, based on the 1897 Russian census
there were approximately 1,161,909 Armenians in the Caucasus region.
Due to natural increases in population, by 1914 the population should have been
around 1,444,000. 142 The men were at war in the Caucasus during World War I so it can
be assumed that by 1917 the population statistics would have been about the same. Of the
Armenians in Ottoman Anatolia, the total population from Erzurum, Van and Bitlis in
1912 was about 485,000. Based on official Russian sources quoted by Richard
Hovannisian for the Armenian population of the Caucasus in 1917, the total number
listed was 1,783,000. Subtracting 1,444,000 from 1,783,000 leaves 339,000 - this means
that the extra 339,000 must have come mostly from Ottoman Anatolia. 143 These refugees
would have been subject to the cold, dying mostly from starvation and disease.
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The Turks later regained the city, forcing the Armenians of the region to follow
the Russians in their retreat expecting asylum. Once the Russians retook the city of Van
in September of 1915, and defeated the Turks at Kopriikoy in January of 1916, Russian
dominance in the East was assured. The Armenians believed that they would be allowed
to return to their homes following the Russian victory in the East, yet the Russians would
not allow it, putting the entire region under the command of a military governor. 144 It was
a result that the Armenians did not expect having previously arranged an agreement that
the area taken in the east by the Russians would become an Armenian nation of the
Russian Empire. 145 Of the Armenians that remained, many of those who joined forces
with the Russians had already been a part of the Armenian resistance in the East.
Ottoman and Russian Armenians, as well as Armenian deserters from the Ottoman army,
were among them leading the Russian forces moving further west, deeper into Ottoman
territory on the offensive.
Salahi Sonyel, wrote about the irregular Armenian groups that operated under
Russian control and the aftermath of the rebellion at Van. Sonyel wrote:
The atrocities committed by the Armenian volunteer forces accompanying the
Russian army were so severe that the Russian commanders themselves were compelled to
withdraw them from the battle fronts and employ them in the rearguard duties. The
memoirs of many Russian officers, who served in the East at this time, are full of
accounts of atrocities committed by these Armenian guerrillas, which were savage even
by the relatively primitive war standards then observed in such areas. 146

What is remarkable about this statement is that many of the irregular forces operating
under Russian command were generally supported by Cossack regiments in irregular
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operations. The Cossacks were known for their uncompromising brutality and their skill
and application in unconventional tactics. The fact that Russian officers' testimony of the
Armenian irregulars brutality was worthy of noting is compelling when considering the
source.
McCarthy says, "Of the original 575,000 Armenians in the four provinces,
339,000 survived when the fighting ended, a mortality rate of 41 percent." Regarding the

Muslim population it is important to quote him directly:
"Muslim mortality was statistically worse, although the disaster for both peoples
was so great that such comparisons have little meaning. Of the 313,000 Muslims who had
lived in Van before the rebellion and war, only 1119,000 were present at war's end. The
other 194,000 (62 percent, nearly two-thirds) had died.,,147
It is obvious that everyone in the region had suffered tremendously on both sides of the

conflict. Although, the civilians had taken the brunt of the atrocities as they generally do
in wartime. McCarthy also says that:
"During the Russian invasion and after Van City had fallen, the Armenians set
about ridding the province of Muslims. Despite the flight of refugees, a sizable Muslim
population still remained in the villages. Attacks on Muslim villages had been limited by
the speed of the Russian and Armenian advance. Once the province had fallen, however,
the attacks increased and became methodical. They followed a constant pattern: wounded
and sick Muslim soldiers ... were always among the first to be killed, along with any
officials or religious leaders. Where adult males were present, the men and young boys
were taken away and killed. In some villages the women were then raped and sometimes
killed.,,148
Aside from the obvious reasons for relocation and the security of the people of the
region, whether it was Muslims from Armenians or Armenians from Muslim reprisals,
there are other more technical reasons for their relocation. From a counterinsurgency
standpoint, it would have been vital to the Ottoman war effort to secure their lines of
communication. Armenian insurgents recognized this fact which is why among the many
147
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guerrilla tactics that they utilized, cutting the Ottoman lines of communication was one of
the most effective. Sonyel argues that, "the possibility of widespread rebellion behind
Ottoman lines, and of the danger of the Ottoman army having to fight on a number of
fronts, with its lines of communication threatened, compelled the Ottoman government,
on 24 April, to decide to remove the Armenians from vulnerable strategic points where
they could assist the enemy.,,149
There was no existing counterinsurgency doctrine in the Ottoman Empire at that
time; therefore, there are no clear indications of its application in documentary evidence.
There is, however, enough evidence to suggest that the Ottomans were greatly concerned
with the protection of supply and communication lines through the use of intelligence and
the relocation of civilians. Due to the poor roads and lines of communication, it would
have been essential for the Ottomans to secure these aspects of military defense in eastern
Anatolia. Without the protection of this region and its strategic vulnerability based on its
proximity to the Russian border, an all out Russian invasion of eastern Anatolia would
have been imminent. Indeed, the Russians did invade Anatolia as they had many times
before. With the help of Armenian insurgents within the Ottoman Empire, the Russian
invasion of Anatolia during World War I was aided by Armenian insurgents and posed a
clear threat to the continuity of the Empire.
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CHAPTER IV
THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE COUNTERINSURGENCY EXPERIENCE
PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I

"On occasion it may be necessary to move or resettle civilians, because such
action is urgently requiredfor military activities. Under no circumstance do you
burn civilian property without approval of higher authority. Similarly you do not
steal from civilians. Failure to obey these rules is a violation of the laws of armed
conflict and punishable by court-martial. ,,/50
-United States Marine Corps, Guidebookfor Marines, 2001

British South Africa and the Anglo-Boer War
By 1899, at the outset of war with the Boers, the British already had experience
defending the honor of the Crown in their colonies abroad. The war with the Boers seems
to have been little more than a combination of repairing a wounded ego and securing
commercial opportunities in the region, mainly from diamonds and gold. South Africa
was formerly a Dutch colony until 1795 when a republic replaced Holland's royal
government, a change which was inspired by the French. England was handed the reins
of Dutch colonies by the Prince of Orange in the hopes that one day Holland could regain
its colonial possessions. Until that point, South Africa had been under the control of the
Dutch East Africa Company for 143 years. Although trouble mounted throughout the
subsequent decades following British control, it was this transfer of power that fueled the
fires of discontent for colonial rule within the Boer collective.
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The Boers, meaning "farmers" (also called Afrikaners), were the multinational
result of years of migration to the region from a number of European countries. Settlers
from Holland, France and Germany constituted the majority of the population in the early
years of the republics. Boers, like most colonial settlers, were rugged, strong willed
people forged through years of adaptation in harsh territory. Since the beginning of the
regions' settlement in 1652, the Boers struggled to carve a life for themselves in their
new African homeland. As is the case with most colonial settlements, the natives, or
Hottentots (now known as the Kohekohe), of the region were the first to feel the effects
of European colonialism. European settlement inevitably meant violent clashes between
the two groups as the settlers pushed further into the interior, conflict, and ultimately
subjugation of the indigenous Kohekohe by the Boers.15l
The Boers were, as their name implies, famlers of South Afi·ica. Much like their
American cousins, the value of slave labor was soon realized, though the source of
indigenous personnel required to fill the position was readily available. The Kohekohe
were the primary source of indigenous labor utilized by the Boers after their continued
conflicts proved that the Boers were not going anywhere. When the British took control
of the African colony, they saw the Boer's relationship with the natives as a violation of
humanity. According to Byron Farwell, "British concepts of justice and humanity
conflicted with those of Britain's truculent white South African subjects. From the
beginning, her policies were designed to protect what she regarded as the interests of the
natives and to prevent the abuse of slaves and Hottentot servants, who often lived in a
state close to slavery." '-2
~
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It was, of course, a noble gesture of royal colonial integrity. For the Boers,
however, British meddling in African affairs was a gross breach of relative autonomy.
This was especially infuriating for the Boers considering that the South African economy
was primarily based on slave labor. 153 Reforms under British law followed over the next
thirty years (1795-1828) granting more rights to the indigenous Kohekohe and removing
the shackles of indignity in South African farming culture. The reforms were a
tremendous source of tension between the Boers and the British, eVt:ntually resulting in
one notable skirmish which is still remembered to this day as "The Hanging at Slachter's
Nek." The hanging was a public display of British supremacy when five men were
executed after a failed revolt of sixty men against the British. The revolt was a reprisal
for killing a Boer farmer named Bezuidenhout l54 who resisted arrest for failure to
acknowledge several court summons. Bezuidenhout was hailed a hero and the five men
executed became martyrs for a cause. 155 Conflict with the British became even more
likely when, in 1833, slavery was abolished throughout the Empire.
By December 1, 1834, all of the 39,021 slaves of the South African colony were
to be emancipated under the new British law. This meant that a great many farms would
eventually go under due to their dependence on slave labor. Compensation was promised
by the British government with more that £3 million expected (about $101.9 million
today), though only about £ 1.2 million was actually provided for reimbursement, which
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was payable in London. 156 From this, it is evident that based on the rugged nature ofthe
Boer community being similar to that of the American frontiersman, attempts at colonial
control and restrictions in unsettled territory would inevitably be met with resistance. It
would seem that such attempts at control by a distant empire, offering what appeared to
be very little assistance in return for obedience, would ultimately be met with rebellion.
Even though the logic behind intervention was sound and the abolishment of slavery a
utilitarian judgment, the Boers surely could not have been expected to simply accept it.

Boer Displacement and Relocation
Tensions finally came to a head in October of 1899, when the Anglo-Boer War
finally began. Negotiations had failed on numerous occasions and appeals for peace and
reconciliation went virtually unheard. The British, prior to the declaration of war with the
Boers, had suffered notably humiliating defeats at Gorbler's Farm 157 and Majuba. 158 It is
necessary to illustrate the significance of Majuba in order to portray the importance it had
in the minds of both the British and the Boers leading up to the war.. Farwell writes:

Majuba, although a small affair, was particularly mortifying for Britain; never
before in its long history had British arms suffered such a humiliating defeat: a group of
unsoldiery farm boys had completely routed a British force containing elements of the
Royal Navy and regulars from some of the most famous regiments in the British army,
and a force, moreover, that was six times larger thlm that for the Boers and in what ought
to have been an impregnable position.,,159
Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 6
The incident at Gorbler's fann was a surprise attack on a British regiment scouting for Boer
resistance. The result was a warning issued by the Boers to the British regiment of immediate surrender or
be killed. The British refused and the Boers opened fire, killing 56 soldiers, I woman, and wounding 10 I,
of which 20 later died.
158 Under cover of darkness, British forces had gained the high groundln order to surprise the
Boer forces and defeat them with tactical superiority in every way. The result, however, was the
humiliating defeat of the British force, the death of the unit commander and the retreat and capture of
countless British soldiers. (See Martin Meredith, Diamonds, Gold, and War: The British, the Boers, and the
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Perhaps the most important incident, however, was the failed coup d'etat in 1895. British
immigrants from the gold rush and mine owners, including Cecil Rhodes, the prime
minister of Cape Colony, attempted to overthrow the Boer government in favor of British
rule. The coup was a complete failure and yet another embarrassing blow to the British
ego.

160

The Boers were some of the tinest marksmen in the world, able to judge distance
easily based on an intimate knowledge of the landscape. This was undoubtedly the result
of their lifestyle in the Transvaal, an area northeast of their previous homeland before the
British abolished slavery. The men ofthe Transvaal were rugged just as their forefathers
were; however, they had developed an even greater sense of independence the further
they had moved from British control. 161 This surely contributed to their use of guerrilla
tactics when they fought the British during the war.
The first year of the war (1899) had not gone according to plan for the Boers.
Sieges in major cities such as Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley made a British
victory nearly assured because they had gained territorial superiority over the Boers in
defense of the Transvaal. Due to their losses in the Transvaal, the Boers began the second
phase of the war, adopting guerrilla tactics to which they were better suited. Their skills
with the more advanced, clip fed, Mauser rifle - coupled with their talents as horsemen made the Boers a formidable foe during this new phase of warfare.
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weapon where the Metford and the Enfield were loaded individually. This meant that while the two
opposing soldiers could fire five rounds at the same speed, a Boer commando had a much greater rate of
fire than a British soldier with successive shots. Not to mention that the Mauser was far more accurate than
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utilize their knowledge of the landscape and their affinity for surprise attack to make
trouble for the British forces. They struck without warning by destroying trains, railways,
bridges and attacking small convoys and garrisons. They also used sniping to their
advantage rather than direct conflict with the enemy as they had done the previous
year. 163
Alexander Downes wrote that there are two uses of civilian victimization which
can be used to defeat an insurgency. One is by targeting noncombatants in order to deter
others from supporting the enemy forces. The other is by severing the civilian support
base from guerrilla access. Downes argues that, "In this scenario, incumbents either kill
or relocate large numbers of civilians in order to make it physically impossible for the
insurgents to obtain food, shelter, recruits, or intelligence from the people.,,164 The
success of such methods obviously does not justifY their use. What Downes is trying to
point out is the crucial role that civilians play in determining control, either for the
insurgency or counterinsurgency.
It was the British difficulties in combating the Boer guerrillas which led to

international criticism of their decisions. Because of the Boer's mobility, which was fast
and agile compared to the slow movements of British troops, it was impossible to keep up
with them. The British had to be everywhere at once, and the Boers were able to strike
wherever they pleased at will. Because of this, the British chose to deny the Boers their
source of support within the civilian community. This meant the burning of farmsteads to

the British Metford and Enfield rifles. This was mostly the result of poor preparation on the part of the
British, the Metford and Enfield rifles had been poorly sited before they reached the soldiers. Not to
mention the fact that the British were unaccustomed to the South African landscape, making the judgment
of distances very challenging. (see Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 43)
163 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 324
164 Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
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deny passing commando units' food, the construction of blockhouses and the resettlement
of the civilian population into camps. 165
The Boer commanders knew that direct action against the British in the form of
regular warfare was no longer an option by 1900. Simultaneously, the British realized
that the Boers were headstrong, not to give in so easily after only one year of fighting the
Empire. Therefore, it was decided on September 22, 1900 that camps would be
constructed for the Boers who wished to surrender voluntarily and submit to British
protection and control within these camps. By December 21, 1900, it was realized that
there were significant advantages to herding civilians into these camps, both with their
consent and against their will, in order to combat the guerrilla threat from the Boer
commandos. Farwell wrote that, "More Boer boys and girls under the age of sixteen died
in British concentration camps than all the fighting men killed by bullets and shells on
both sides in the course of the entire war.,,166
Between December of 1900 and February of 1902, within the fifty or so camps
that had been constructed, there were around 160,000 Boer inmates total and about
130,000 Africans. 167 By war's end, of the approximate 160,000 inmates about 27,927
Boers had died in the camps, mostly attributed to disease and starvation. This left the
camps with a 17 percent fatality rate of the total number of incarcerated civilians. The
fatality rate of women or children under the age of sixteen was 94 percent, according to
Downes figures from Andre Wessels. 168 The technique proved to be effective because by
removing the civilians from the field of battle, which in the case of the Transvaal and
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Cape colony could have been anywhere, meant that the civilians could not support the
guerrillas, voluntarily or otherwise. British soldiers also burnt farms and killed livestock
to remove the source of support for the roaming guerrillas; a tactic most famously
employed by the Russians to prevent the advance of Napoleons army into Russia.
British forces made use of the extensive blockhouse system in order to choke and
isolate enemy movements across the open region. The British increased their patrols and
protection of supply lines, further removing guerrilla potential for attack and a means of
supply. 169 Strangling the Boers into submission was indeed a well adapted process.
Perhaps the most effective technique, however, was the use of concentration camps in
order to deny the guerrillas a crucial support base. The table below illustrates this point
by recording a rise in the number of civilians interned gradually throughout the final
phase of the war.
TABLE 4.1 British Population Statistics for Civilian Relocation Camps 170

Camp Population
1901

1902

June
July
August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
May

Blue Book!7!

Deaths
85,410
93,940
105,347
109,314
113,506
117,974
117,017
114,376
114,311
111,508
112,733
116,572

777
1,412
1,878
2,411
3,156
2,807
2,380
1,805
628
402
298
196

Cd 608
Cd 694
Cd 789
Cd 793
Cd 853
Cd 934
Cd 902
Cd 934
Cd 939
Cd 939
Cd 942
Cd 1161

Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 350
Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 408
171 The Blue Book was a series of documents meant to rebut claims of inhumanity from the
international community. Each number refers to a document which is meant to be an accurate portrayal of
the conditions and population figures of the camps throughout the war.
169
170
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The table shows a noticeable increase in the number of interned civilians in the
British camps. The interned would, as previously stated, have been members of the local
communities viewed as a threat to British supremacy and control of the region. Coupled
with the rise in civilian interned there is a noticeable rise in the number of deaths as well.
This was mainly the result of overcrowding. Overcrowding led to unsanitary conditions
and ultimately the rapid spread of disease. The conditions of the camps would have been
the responsibility of the British government, though the result was that they were
unwilling to provide adequate services and supplies to the civilians within the camps,
mainly in an effort to save money.
Lord Kitchener, the man who took control of British armed forces in the second
phase of the Boer War, admitted in June 1901, that one of the other reasons for creating
the camps was to coax the Boer commandos into submission by creating a strong desire
to be with their families. 172 At first, there had been a preferential treatment system
regarding the issuance of rations to the interned civilians of the camps. The people who
had voluntarily surrendered to internment were given more food while those who were
forced received less. According to a prison doctor, the voluntary inmates maintained a
diet which was "deficient in fats and phosphates," and that those who had been interned
maintained a diet which was "not consistent with the maintenance of health for any
lengthened period.,,1?3
British statistics from Blue Book documents differ with more recent statistics,
including the large number of African civilians which also died as a result of internment

172 Godfrey. H. L. Le May, British Supremacy in South Africa /899-/907, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1965), 96
173 Le May, British Supremacy, 97
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and the scorched earth policy adopted by the British throughout the guerrilla phase of the
war. The number of civilians killed is obviously a daunting prospect and a stain on
British history, yet what is important here is the camps application as a measure of
success in warfare. What is also important to recognize is the effectiveness and success of
a guerrilla or insurgent fighting force and the extreme measures necessary to overcome
them. The table below shows the relative application of military forces and their success.
In the first phase of the Boer war, the Boers utilized conventional tactics with
unconventional regimental structure with greater manpower and they were quickly
overwhelmed. When they adopted guerrilla tactics in 1900, however, they were able to
hold out for another two years against the British, even with a smaller fighting force.
The numbers speak for themselves showing that, by isolating the civilian
population from the Boer resistance, the British were able to choke the Boers into
submission. The British denied the Boers both emotional and strategic support by using
the civilians as the center of gravity, turning the Boers greatest weapon of resistance
against them. The will to fight the British would have been strong indeed, though perhaps
the will to protect ones family and means of survival was stronger.
TABLE 4.2 Manpower and fatalities ofthe Second Anglo-Boer War l74

British

Manpower at start of war
Fielded forces, end 1900
Total manpower employed
Military fatalities
Civilian fatalities
Total war deaths

174

20,000
200,000
478,435
21,942
NA
21,942

Downes, Targeting Civilians in War, 164
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Boers

55-60,000
20,000
87,365
6,189
27,927
34,116

Southeast Asia and the Philippine-American Conflict

The Philippine-American conflict was fought in a way very similar to how the
British handled South Africa. Like the Anglo-Boer war, it consisted of two stages against
an indigenous population seeking the removal of a foreign enemy in favor of gaining
independence. The battle for the Philippines was first fought against the Spanish Empire
in 1897, who at the time, maintained control over the archipelago. Later, United States
involvement followed after the Spanish American war of 1898. At the forefront of the
rebellion was the secret organization known as the Katipunan society 175, which had
attempted an insurgency during August of 1896. The failed attempt at insurrection
resulted in the use of guerrilla tactics. Emilio Aguinaldo became the main leader of the
movement due to the notoriety he gained fighting the Spanish. Despite their efforts to
remove the Spanish from the Philippines, Aguinaldo was forced into exile in exchange
for a promise that the Spanish empire would concede new democratic reforms under their
continued control of the region. Unfortunately, once Aguinaldo left., the Spanish quickly
forgot the promises that they had made. 176
Though Aguinaldo was hailed as a competent organizer regarding the Filipino
resistance through the Katipunan, he failed to develop as a military strategist and field
175 The name Katipunan refers to the organization under Andres Bonifacio. Based in Manila, the
organization stood for the "Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Sons of the Country." It was a
secret organization, bathed in mystique and societal rituals, compiling "revolutionary rhetoric" and
nationalist idealism, as well as Tagalog ethnocentrism. The society ultimately sought complete
independence from Spain, even if it meant armed insurrection. Though the organization had widespread
success, it was mainly limited to the area of Manila and was plagued by tribal rivalries, also lacking
sustainable cohesion. This would later be a problem solved by Emilio Aguinaldo. (See Brian M. Linn, The
u.s. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, i899-i902, [Chapel hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1989],4)
176 John Ellis, From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary and Counterinsurgency Warfare, From the Romans to the Present, (London: Greenhill Books, 1995), 132
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commander. His background in politics and inter-island business dealings had been the
source of his recognition and initial success within the communities . His ability to hold
the irregular forces together to fight the Spanish is what set him apart as a leader. 177 The
United States had been fighting the Spanish in 1898 at the same time that Filipino
revolutionaries were attempting to seize control of the islands through insurgency and
guerrilla tactics. Because of his standing within the community, primarily the Tagalog
provinces, Aguinaldo was an ideal candidate for the leadership of indigenous troops and
what was intended to be a smooth governmental transition. Aguinaldo, unaware that the
transition of leadership was intended to be one from Spanish to American, was supportive
of American forces taking control of Manila with the assistance and support of his
irregulars. Although, Aguinaldo and the U.S. (American Consul E. Spencer Pratt) were
suspicious of one another's motives once victory over the Spanish was attained. 178
If attempts at understanding this transitional period - from a Filipino-American
coalition against the Spanish to a Filipino-American conflict - seem difficult, it is
because they are. Realistic interpretations of the source of conflict are hard to come by.
The Americans were suspicious of the Filipinos, fearing that they might attempt to take
control of Manila, and were determined to be independent. Comparatively, Filipinos were
suspicious of American intentions once they had d~~feated the Spanish in Manila. Both
assumptions proved to be correct no matter how one views this particular aspect of
history from 1898-1899 in the Philippines. As Brian Linn argues, "the circumstances
surrounding the outbreak are still matters of strong dispute. The actual events are still
unclear, as is the much larger issue of who, if anyone, was responsible for starting the
177
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war.,,179 As is the case in virtually all warfare, and especially in the cases of the
aforementioned conflicts within this thesis, each side inevitably blames the other for
being the catalyst to open conflict.
What is clear, however, is that after the defeat of the Spanish by the United States,
and the negotiation of the Treaty of Paris in 1898, Spain relinquished control of its
territories - most importantly, the Philippines. Two days before the treaty's ratification,
open conflict erupted between Filipino and American forces in Manila. What would
follow was a three year war which led more than 4,200 Americans and over 16,000
Filipino soldiers to their deaths and around 250,000 (if not more) Filipino civilian
casualties from famine, violence or disease. 180 The United States undoubtedly saw value
in the acquisition ofthe Philippines in an attempt to control the archipelago and to keep it
out of German or Japanese hands at all costs.

Filipino Displacement and Relocation
Much like the Anglo-Boer war, the first phase was fought within the first year of
the war in the Philippines. Conventional warfare operations fought by both sides lasted
from February to November of 1899. The fighting mainly centered in Manila because of
its strategic importance though the conflict began to shift more toward the north by
November. Filipino nationalists had successfully assisted the Americans in taking control
of Manila by isolating Spanish garrisons outside the city and then enveloping Manila.

Linn, Philippine War, 42
Spencer Tucker, The Encyclopedia o/the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars: A
Political, Social. and Military History, Volume /(ABC-CLIO, 2009), accessed February 10,2013,
http://books.google.com/books?id=8V3vZxOmHssC&pg=PA478&dq=deaths+in+the+philippine+american
+war&hl=en&sa= X&ei=fRU uUY yEI vGOOHXn4DABO&ved=OCDM06AEwAA#v=onepage&q=deaths%20in%20the(%20philippine%20american
%20war&f=false
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This position meant that the Americans were in control of Manila Bay after the surrender
of the Spanish, leaving them also enveloped by the surrounding Filipino national army. 181
For months the two armies prepared for a potential clash and in February, the 8th corps of
the U.S. Army made short work of the Filipino Army of Liberation. Aguinaldo and his
Army of Liberation theoretically should have been able to defeat the American forces
simply by way of sheer numbers and civilian population support, allowing the Army of
Liberation to attack the Americans at both the front and the rear of their line of defense,
striking from within. The Army of Liberation and its military leadership had been ill
prepared for an assault and were constantly plagued by poor, short-sighted decision
making. 182
The losses in Manila and the mounting losses throughout the year until November
forced the Filipino insurgency further into the interior of the country. It also pressed the
issue that they were not suited to fight in open conventional conflict with American
forces. The adoption of guerrilla tactics was a decision made by Aguinaldo after the
November raid of Tarlac, Aguinaldo's headquarters north of Manila. General MacArthur
moved toward Aguinaldo's position and took Tarlac without a fight. This has generally
been attributed to the arrival of Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton's amphibious landing at San
Fabian on the Lingayen Gulf and his 2,500 reinforcement troops that he brought with
him. 183 The geographic location of San Fabian and Wheaton's reinforcements created a
choke point north of Manila as Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton swept Northeast and
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MacArthur kept the Filipinos in central Luzon pinned. 184 Aguinaldo and his forces had no
choice but to flee and hope to fight another day. Aguinaldo's main concern had been to
escape, which he managed to do. Following this move by American forces and the
continued defeats over the last nine months of the Filipino forces, Aguinaldo decided that
it was time for a change in strategy. It was clear that the Filipino forces were simply not
prepared to fight a conventional war. Therefore, Aguinaldo decreed that from then on,
they would utilize their familiarity with the terrain and the local population to blend into
their surroundings and continue the fight with irregular tactics, no longer wearing
uniforms and fighting a war "without fronts or fixed positions.,,185
Military strategy of the United States during the insurgency or guerrilla phase of
the war had been shaped from experiences in the Civil War and the Indian Campaigns.
Under General Order No. 100, the Regular Army utilized the irregular tactics that had
proven useful in the past and were widely accepted. The Order essentially allowed for the
pacification of irregular forces by separating them from the civilian population, the
separation of noncombatants from armed opponents. Those who continued to resist
American forces risked imprisonment, forced removal from their property, or having
their homes and their crops burned or destroyed. 186 The move was intended to restore
order and to ensure that violence would be contained and eventually eradicated.
It is important to mention that, due to the 1899 Army Act, American forces in the

Philippines consisted of two military organizations; Army Regular forces and the
volunteer forces made up of state militias from all of the United States. Army Regulars

184 Brian Linn, The u.s. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, (Chapel
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were far more disciplined than the irregular volunteers and had a better understanding of
military tactics and unit cohesion. The volunteer forces had courage and enthusiasm, yet
at times, they proved difficult to control due to restructuring of Army units under
different commanders than they had grown accustomed to within their own militia
structures back home. 187
The American forces fought various skirmishes against the guerrillas throughout
1900, though the plan to pacify the civilian population was not instituted until after
McKinley's election in November of 1900. Because of the rapid success in the SpanishAmerican War and the victory over the Liberation Army in Manila, it was believed
victory in the Philippines would be achieved much sooner than it was progressing in the
winter of 1900. Public pressure in the United States and the fear that "the guerrilla war
would become a chronic problem if pacification were not forthcoming," led to the
decision to increase military pressure on guerrilla D)rCes. By 1900, the conditions were
right for an offensive against the insurgency in the Philippines. American troop strength
was approaching 70,000, the monsoon season was at its end, allowing greater ease of
troop movement, and American forces were well supplied to begin a campaign of
pacification.

188

One aspect of the U.S. Military counterinsurgency approach during this period is
worthy of note. In December of 1900, the Army organized a Division of Military
Information. The purpose of this organization was to collect any peltinent intelligence
that might be useful to the military in countering guerrilla forces. The Division had been
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instructed to "pay agents 'liberally' and give them as much protection as possible.,,189 In
Manila alone, special attention was given to the eradication of revolutionary
organizations and between November 1, 1900 and February 1, 1901, agents arrested
around 600 people, 250 of which were officers of the insurgency. 190 Contrary to what
some might consider an all out insurgency in the region, the opposite is true. According
to Linn, "in thirty-four of the seventy-seven provinces (44 percent) the total of military
operations between United States troops and supporters of the Philippine Republic was
zero; that is, in nearly half of the provinces there was no fighting at a11.,,191 What this
means is that there was not an overwhelming amount of support for the Filipino
insurgency, yet they still proved successful against American forces until the U.S.
decided it was time to pursue a hard line toward

th(;~

insurgency and institute the use of

spies in major cities and greater pacification efforts.
(The institution of secret organizations within the indigenous community as a
counterinsurgency technique was also a tactic utilized by the Ottomans throughout World
War I. The organization known as the

Te~kilat-l

Mahsusa [Special Organization] was the

Special Forces of Enver Pa~a. Their purpose was "to cope with what he regarded as twin
threats to security of the Ottoman state, namely, indigenous separatist movements and
European aggression."I92 Little is known about the organization due to its clandestine
nature as well as virtually no scholarship on the organization existing. Philip Stoddard
wrote that what is known about the

Te~kilat-l

Mahsusa is; it was a secretive and

disreputable group engaged in guerrilla warfare, espionage, counter-espionage and
Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 209
Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 208-209
191 Linn, Philippine War, 185
192 Philip H. Stoddard. "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911-1918: A Preliminary
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propaganda; the group was not "the proper concern of any department of government"
except for the Ministry of War; and that it was

"libt~rally"

awarded funding that was

"outside the regular war budget." 193 What makes the institution of this organization so
fascinating and ultimately relevant to the study of Ottoman counterinsurgency is their
creation in general. According to Stoddard's research, sources point to August 5, 1914, as
the day the organization was given an official name. He stipulates, however, that Cemal
Pa~a

- Commander of Ottoman forces in Egypt and one of the three leaders of the Empire

- referred to the Te~kilat-l Mahsusa in his memoirs as early as 1913. 194 If the information
based on interviews with former members is true then it indicates that internal security of
the Empire from external as well as internal indigenous threats was much greater than
many realize).
In 1901, the U.S. truly began placing noticeable pressure on the insurgency and
it was clear that it would not last much longer. The Army utilized local native volunteers
to hunt down the guerrillas in the field while the Federal party sought to negotiate their
surrender. The Army began arresting and deporting the principalia (noble class) that
supported the insurgency in a show of force that was meant to be an example to others
what the consequences would be if warfare continued. Army units isolated the
surrounding mountainous borders to prevent insurgent escape. The Military formed
commissions which tried and executed insurgent captives and sanctioned the destruction
of crops and the isolation of civilian populations to remove their potential to support the
.

msurgency.
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American forces were growing weary of gm~rrilla warfare by September 1901,
and the attack on Balangiga was the lynch pin which released the fury of American
military reprisal. Balangiga, Samar was the site of a combined attack by guerrillas and
townspeople which left 48 Americans dead and 74 wounded. The result is an indication
of American resolve to end the war in the Philippines. Linn writes that,

Infuriated by the 'massacre' at Balangiga, frustrated by continued warfare, and
outraged at guerrilla terrorism, the Americans ended the Philippine war with vindictive
ruthlessness. Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith, the commander of the Sixth Separate Brigade,
ordered one of his officers to tum Samar into a 'howling wilderness' and to shoot any
males over age ten. Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, commanding the Third Separate Brigade
in southern Luzon, concentrated most of the populace into guarded zones, where many
died of malnutrition and sickness. 196

The result was the further suffering of civilians, directly through military action or
indirectly by the destruction of farms and the loss of livestock. By June of 1902, resulting
from the two campaigns under Smith and Bell, the last of the insurgency surrendered.
Smith was eventually court-martialed and five officers were tried for war crimes. 197
Bell's campaign, however, has since been described as "a masterpiece of counterguerrilla warfare.,,198
Just as conditions had been in the Anglo-Boer war, camps were, " ... overcrowded
and suffered from food shortages and sanitation that ranged from poor to appalling.,,199
According to Linn, Glen A. May has made the mos.t thorough study of this time period
regarding morality and has concluded that due to estimates of malnutrition, substandard
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sanitation, and disease " ... may have cost as many as 11,000 Filipino lives and made the
population susceptible to the cholera epidemic of 1902.,,200 Stuart Miller wrote of Bell's
population relocation efforts saying, "The entire population outside of the major cities in
Batangas was herded into concentration camps, which were bordered by what Bell called
'dead lines.' Everything outside of the camps was systematically destroyed - humans,
crops, food stores, domestic animals, houses, and boats.,,201
Unfortunately, accurate numbers from this period of history are very hard to come
by. Civilian death estimates in the Philippines have been argued as both inflated and
understated, with the most conservative estimates at 200,000 and the most extreme
estimates at 700,000. 202 John Gates argues, however, that due to the public distaste for the
war and sensational journalism, as well as statistical manipulation, accurate numbers
have been overshadowed by sloppy scholarship.203 In fact, Gates argues that the majority
of the civilian casualties were the result of a cholera epidemic which infected the islands
towards the end of the war and continued after it ended. Gates used the projected
population statistics of Filipino birth rates and contrasted those numbers with the 1903
census estimates taken by the Filipino government and concluded that a more accurate
number of civilian casualties was actually around 234,000. 204
Gates attributes the majority of these deaths. to cholera and various sources
consistently place the number of casualties around 200,000 deaths. This illustrates that
regardless of the reasons for civilian collateral resulting from war, the result is the same;
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noncombatants are killed in great numbers especially in counterinsurgency operations. It
must also be considered that irregular operations tend to be more costly for the invading
or foreign power. It cost the United States an incredible $400 million (around $10 trillion
today) to defeat the Filipino insurgents, which was much more than it had cost to defeat
Spain a few years earlier.

2os

Like the efforts of the Anglo-Boer War and the Americans in the Philippines, the
Turks were faced with the same issues in relocating large numbers of the population. The
logistical difficulties in moving such large numbers of people inevitably results in the
catastrophic loss of life, mainly from disease and starvation. Civilian casualties in
warfare, no matter the scale, though extremely unfortunate, are inevitable. Downes
argued that:
States seek to win the wars they fight quickly and in an economical fashion.
States rarely begin wars with a strategy predicated on targeting civilians .. .In relatively
short, bloodless wars ... civilian victimization is rare, but when anned conflicts devolve
into protracted wars of attrition, the probability mounts that noncombatants will be
victimized as a means to reduce costs and avoid defeat. 206

Downes also argued that, based on data compiled involving all interstate wars between
1816 and 2003, the evidence showed that, "Wars of attrition - conflicts characterized by
static, positional warfare, sieges, or counterinsurgency - and wars in which a belligerent
intended to conquer and annex its neighbor's land

~!ach

significantly increased the

likelihood of civilian victimization and the number of civilian casualties a state
inflicted.,,207 Though the conflicts covered in this thesis are limited to the Turks, the
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British and Americans, spanning just over a decade of conflict, this argument further
illustrates the fact that civilians often suffer the most in warfare.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS

"Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man's warfare ~ it is the graduate level of
war. .. 208
-Special Forces Officer in Iraq, 2005
The Ottomans did not invent irregular warfare and certainly were not the only
great power to encounter insurgency and partisan warfare before or since the First World
War. Irregular warfare by definition simply implies. that the forces used for fighting are
not part of a regular army, making them irregulars. Though, it has often been coupled
with the use of unconventional methods making it more ofa blanket term to insinuate the
use of unregimented tactics. Irregular warfare is particularly complex because it allows
the combatants, who have been referred to as partisans, guerrillas, insurgents and even
terrorists, to blend into their surroundings by not dawning the military distinction of a
uniform. Therefore, they are incredibly difficult to identify, making them equally difficult
to isolate from noncombatants.
This also means that whoever the counterinsurgency units may be, they must find
a way to combat the threat of unconventional warfare. In some cases, adopting their
tactics is a tempting prospect. The United States Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual
illustrates this by saying:

208 The u.s. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 2007), 1
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"Counterinsurgency can bring out the worst in the best regular armies. Even when
COIN [Counterinsurgency] forces explicitly reject insurgent tactics, they often come to
imitate them. In particular, the insurgents' invisibility often tempts counterinsurgents to
erase the all-important distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. Historically,
this has sometimes been a preferred strategy.,,209

In the case of the uniform distinction, however, even if counterinsurgents were to
disregard the uniform, they would still be inevitably faced with differences in religion,
skin color, language, cultural understanding, territorial awareness and familiarity, and the
list goes on and on. Losing the uniform and fighting in civilian clothing is not a
wholesale solution. It is a band-aid over a gaping wound. That is to say, there are
numerous elements to counterinsurgency operations, like warfare in general, which can
be applied to aid a much larger operation.

It goes without saying that the nature of warfare in the twenty-first century
continues to shift from large scale conflict to small scale hit and run tactics. The way that
great powers worldwide deal with this type of wartlre has been carefully crafted through
years of experience - trial and error. Perhaps the greatest challenge in counterinsurgency
comes from this non military distinction - the stripping away of regular military
identification. In such cases, partisans, guerrillas, irregulars or insurgents, rely heavily
upon a civilian population in order to supplement their needs as a fighting force. The
Cuban revolution of 1953-1959 is an example of this. In this case, guerrillas fought
regular Cuban forces using "Hit and Run" tactics, which essentially entailed attacking the
enemy and then dissolving back into the forests and mountains that had become their
home as well as their battle ground. Such tactics help in preserving the sustainability of a
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smaller force fighting a larger one. As Che Guevara, field doctor and commander of
guerrilla forces in Cuba said:
"Hit and run, wait, lie in ambush, again hit and run, and thus repeatedly, without
giving any rest to the enemy. There is in all this, it would appear, a negative quality, an
attitude of retreat, of avoiding frontal fights. However, this is consequent upon the
general strategy of guerrilla warfare, which is the same in its ultimate end as is any
warfare: to win, to annihilate the enemy.,,210

Irregular units not only employ unconventional tactics but they often have the
support of the local people. Another of the more famous revolutionary partisans is Mao
Tse Tung, leader of the Chinese Revolution and later Chairman of the People's Republic
of China. Throughout the 1930's and 1940's, Mao fought using guerrilla tactics with the
intention of ultimately forming a larger regular force in order to return China to the
people, famously saying that, "The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy
the enemy.,,211 Popular support of the people was an absolute necessity to Mao's guerrilla
campaign just as it was with Che Guevara and Fidel Castro's revolutionary war in Cuba.
It is easy to condemn the actions of regular forces for using extreme measures in

the heat of irregular warfare. The reason for this is simply the heart-wrenching results of
civilian involvement, regardless of which side they support. From a fundamental
standpoint, however, it is extremely difficult to fight a multi-front war, regardless of its
scale. When your enemy is invisible the majority of the time, and not only surrounding
your lines of defense but has a presence within them as well, living among you and your
troops, the potential for chaos and retribution begins to mount in any theater.
Such was the case in Manila following the end of the Spanish American war and
the immediate beginning of another with the Filipino irregulars who had previously been
210
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helping the Americans. Aguinaldo's decision to favor irregular tactics for the remainder
of the war was a decision made out of necessity. in the interest of self preservation and
continuing the fight against their foreign occupiers. Aguinaldo made it virtually
impossible for American forces to discern combatant from noncombatant, apart from the
obvious gender and age restrictions in most cases. Because of this, the decision to begin
utilizing camps as a means of isolation and as a counterinsurgency tactic is not hard to
understand. In the case of the Philippines, especially, the need for containing threats and
controlling the pace and location of battles would have been crucial. Due to its
geographic location, unique in character, the island format for warfare poses new
challenges to the counterinsurgent approach. One challenge would have been the
immediacy of establishing security. David Lonsdale wrote:
Modem COIN [counterinsurgency] practice ... tends to be regarded less as a form
of war and more as a security challenge, with popularity and legitimacy being the key
means to achieving the desirable end state. While there is certainly value in the heartsand-minds aspects of COIN doctrine, we must never lose sight of the fact that COIN is
still a form of war. In fact, an essential ingredient of COIN is inflicting serious military
setback on the insurgents. This not only restricts their ability to undermine security in the
contested territory, it also promotes a sense of authority for the local government and
their allies. 212

If Lonsdale is correct in this argument, then dealing critical military blows to the
insurgent forces and displaying authority is essential in combating insurgency. What
better way to do both than to remove the insurgent's source of support by placing their
support base in isolation camps. The insurgents are then more easily separated from the
civilians and counterinsurgents have demonstrated to the local population and the
government that they are capable of handling the situation, by force if necessary.

m Lonsdale, "Strategy," 39
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When the enemy is capable of not only receiving support from a local population
for their cause, but also able to hide amongst them without being immediately detected, it
is nearly impossible to discern friend from foe, combatant from noncombatant. Therefore,
the most logical explanation in the early nineteenth century was to remove the potential
threat from theaters of war to a location that can be guarded and monitored in order to
minimize the risk of being attacked from within. The human element in irregular warfare
and counterinsurgency tactics is ultimately one of the most important aspects when
considering the possibilities of success. This was true in the United States following the
attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The result of which was the internment of
over 100,000 Japanese Americans out of fear that the same internal security threat which
was responsible for the attacks could potentially attack again from within the United
States. 213
As it has been demonstrated, the relocation of civilians was also a tactic employed
by the British during the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902. In this case, prior to the
insurgency in the Ottoman Empire during World War I, the British had employed the
technique in an attempt to preserve human life and prevent guerrilla support. What
followed were the internment of approximately 250,000 people, and the "recorded"
deaths of about 45,000. 214 The British clearly believed that in order to win, the human
element must be removed from the equation because of its potential to either support the
insurgents or to join their ranks. This mentality has also been demonstrated by the use of
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relocation and internment by the Americans in the Philippines from 1899-1902, resulting
in the internment of an unknown number of people and the reported deaths of about
200,000 civilians? I 5
The Ottoman officers (Mekteblis or New Guard), utilized their skills in foreign
language by following the developments of other nations prior to World War I - nations
such as the United States and Great Britain. They looked to British counterinsurgency
during the Boer war for inspiration and ultimately applied such tactics to their encounters
with irregular warfare and counterinsurgency?16 They had come to be a product of
Prussian military strategy because of the Turkish governments' alignment with Germany
in World War I.
While the British and the Americans chose to utilize camps to secure civilians and
quell insurgency, the Turks used forced relocations . The Ottoman Empire was in dire
straits, suffering from fiscal concerns, internal security threats, supply difficulties for
their troops and pressure from every angle by the entente powers. Creating camps would
have simply not been an option. Building camps for civilian relocation would have cost
time and money, two things that the Turks simply could not afford. There was also the
threat of a Russian invasion from the east; therefore, choosing a location that would have
remained secure would have been difficult in the event of a Russian push west into the
empire. There was also certain immediacy to the situation in the east and great concern
for solving the problem as quickly as possible. Unlike the British and Americans, the
Ottoman counterinsurgency efforts were hindered by foreign support for the insurgents.
Though the combat and strategy was fought in similar manner, the Filipinos and the
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Boers were not backed by active support from a major power. Incidentally, the Armenian
revolutionaries were backed by Russia, who

providl~d

weapons, funding, training and

leadership.
Much like the Ottomans, the Americans and the British used irregular units to
handle their insurgency problems. Though, their reasons for this differ. The British
decision to use irregular forces was because the British army preferred to use their regular
forces elsewhere and saw the Boer rebellion as little more than a skirmish. Tradition
would have dictated that the British used their many Indian irregulars to fight the Boers,
however, it was decided that this particular conflict should be one comprised of and
fought by white men, with two thirds of the army made up of poor Irish and Scots. Even
the Boers warned the local Africans not to get invollved in the conflict. 217
The Americans on the other hand, had maintained the regular army as more of a
peace keeping force than a blunt instrument of war in 1899, which had been limited by
congress to 28,000 soldiers. The irregular state militias, however, numbered around
115,000 and were used for the majority of Americas fighting. 218 These were the men who
had been called upon to defend America's territories and honor in the Philippines; men
eager to prove their worth after hearing countless tales of honor and glory in the Civil
War fought by their fathers and grandfathers. As I have previously mentioned, regardless
of their enthusiasm, these men ranged from experie:nced battle formations to
inexperienced civilians eager to do their part.
The Ottomans, however, were faced with very distinct challenges which separated
them from the British and the Americans. In the Turks case, their insurgency was one
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fought on their own soil in the eastern part of the empire. Though the trouble was a long
way from the capital, the threat was still one bred from within by the revolutionary
Armenian community. The Turks, like the British and Americans, relied heavily upon
their irregular forces to fight in the east. The reason for this, however, is because they
were already entangled in the First World War with the British, Russians and French. The
Turks had no choice but to utilize irregular units beeause their regular units could not be
spared. They were being used to support the Germans at the front in Europe. Therefore,
the use of irregulars by the Turks was out of necessity and not by choice.
These examples are at least some indication of the tactics used prior to World War
I during times of internal security threats. They also indicate that some techniques have
not changed, not to mention the fact that such techniques were and have been regularly
applied by Western powers since the First World War. The significance of this is that
while Western observers have condemned the Ottomans for using internment and civilian
displacement, the Ottomans were in fact drawing inspiration from their former British
allies. It is also significant because while contemporary and modem Western scholars
may argue that the Turks were deliberately attempting to annihilate an ethnic minority in
the region, those scholars frequently overlook the f:act that their own governments once
recognized such techniques as an unfortunate necessity in the early twentieth century.
Robert Taber wrote, "Can Guerrilla tactics be employed successfully against
Guerrillas? The answer is negative .. .Indian fighters do not become Indians by taking
scalps. A spotted jungle suit does not make a United States Marine a Guerrilla.,,219 The
devil is in the details, as is often the case in warfare. Isolating a civilian population from
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the possibility of insurgent control through coercion or willful cooperation has become
essential in fighting an irregular war. John McCuen wrote:

Since security of the population will be the first objective of the civic action teams
and isolation of the guerrillas a primary objective of the territorial forces, both these
counter-revolutionary authorities probably will tind that regroupment of the population is
necessary to accomplish their objectives. Of course, regroupment largely will involve the
resettlement of outlying populations which the British successfully employed in
Malaya. no

There has been a noticeable shift in the way that wars have been fought since the end of
World War II. That shift has been one from large scale regular warfare to smaller scale
irregular tactics. It is cheaper, more unpredictable, has the potential for foreign support in
varying degrees, can last for decades and therefore, is more difficult to eradicate.
Erickson argues that Abdulhamid II and his advisors were aware of the possibility
that European forces might intervene on behalf of the Christian separatists in the Balkans
during the 1877-78 wars - where the Ottomans began to shape their understanding of
counterinsurgency prior to World War I and the rebellion at Van. Even with their military
experiences against IMRO (Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization)221 in the
Balkans, the Ottoman hierarchy had consistently passed the responsibility of dealing with
counterinsurgency down the chain of command. The system, which was still one of
loyalty and patron-client relations under Sultan Abdulhamid II, meant that rather than
deal with the problem themselves the unit commanders would often pass the task of
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dealing with counterinsurgency to their officers in the field. 222 As a result, it was the
young officers who had studied European techniques that developed a coherent but
unofficial military doctrine for counterinsurgency. Up until the 1890's, there had been no
official or uniform guide for counterinsurgency. It was a system of trial and error applied
on the front lines. The result was successful according to Uyar and Erickson saying that,
"These unofficial counterinsurgency strategies, tactics, and techniques eventually paid
off, and most of the Komitaci [rebel] groups were crushed and lost ground after 1904.,,223
Therefore, the Ottoman officer corps, responsible for counterinsurgency decisions, had
used what they learned from the West in the Balkans, and in turn, applied their
experiences from the Balkans to Anatolia.
Compiling all of the relative figures from each military entanglement for the
British, the Americans and the Ottomans in each specific case has been examined in this
thesis. That is, the relative numbers of government forces and insurgent casualties versus
the relative number of civilian casualties of war. What these numbers are meant to
illustrate is that while the West condemns the Turks for their counterinsurgency efforts of
the First World War, the British and Americans themselves had utilized the same tactics
little more than a decade earlier.
The Armenian fifth column posed an eminent threat to Ottoman security and the
Ottoman government acted accordingly by removing the threat for the sake of the empire.
The Turks were concerned with saving the lives of their Muslim subjects from rebel
massacres as well as protecting their investment in the region as a source of tax revenue
and internal security from potential threats, mainly Russia. Unlike the Americans in the
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Philippines and the British in South Africa, the Ottomans stood to lose many more
civilians because the war was being waged on their own soil. The fact that they managed
to survive in the midst of the greatest war ever fought in history up to that point, fighting
an insurgency from within and major powers on two fronts is astounding.
With regard to the importance of the rural population in both insurgent and
counterinsurgent operations, the Small Wars Manual states that,
The majority of the people, especially in the rural districts, dislike and fear
revolutions, which often involve forced military service for themselves and the
destruction of their livestock and their farm produce. However, they may be so
accustomed to misgovernment and exploitation that concerted efforts to check disorderly
tendencies of certain leaders never occurs to them. It is this mass ignorance and
indifference rather than any disposition to turbulence in the nation as a whole, which has
prevented the establishment of stable government in many cases. 224

This is a valid statement with regard to rural populations and their malleability. However,
this manual was meant to be a guide to winning small wars through counterinsurgency
efforts and is meant to illustrate the importance of civilian support. What this statement
also indicates, however, is the malleability of the indigenous forces in the other direction,
in support of the insurgents.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

"If there is anything new about guerrilla war -- of which Sun Tzu surprisingly
anticipates by two thousand years virtually all questions of a military nature it is only in its modern political application. To put it another way, the
specifically modern aspect ofguerrilla warfare is in its use as a tool of
political revolution - the single sure method by which an unarmed population
can overcome mechanized armies, or, fililing to overcome them, can stalemate
them and make them irrelevant. ,,225
-Robert Taber, War of the Flea, 2002

Until very recently, research into Ottoman counterinsurgency has been virtually
nonexistent. If we are to better understand their methods then more research is ultimately
necessary. However, based on what we know from the work of Ottoman experts on the
First World War, we can safely make a few assumptions about their standards and
techniques. It is clear that the Ottoman regular forces had generally operated with the
intention of preventing death not instigating it. The Ottoman policy tended to be one of
securing the safety of civilians rather than exacting revenge as a primary concern,
Though it is also clear that many civilians did in fact suffer at the hands of Turks, both
regular and irregular, most of the time the acts of violence were committed by
undisciplined irregular troops and civilians who weTe more concerned with vengeance
than conduct. It is understandable that such acts of violence would be at the forefront of a
collective irregular consciousness because many of the men chosen to supplement
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Ottoman reinforcements in the region were probably affected directly or indirectly by
Armenian violence in the region.
Prior to World War I, the Young Turks of the Committee of Union and Progress
had even tried to appease the Armenian Dashnak party by allowing them to carry
weapons openly in the streets and to hold public office in the region, most likely to
prevent the invasion of Russian forces. The result of which was of course the spreading
of revolutionary ideas and the continuance of subversive activity in the Empire, which
ultimately led to a Russian invasion of Anatolia anyway. When Ottoman forces could not
be used to bring a swift and organized end to the rebellion, irregulars were the responders
to the crises and the inevitable occurred.
The assistance provided to the Russians by Armenian spies and scouts cannot be
overstated nor should it be forgotten in the pages of history. Although the Armenian
rebellion was only a small part of a much larger picture, their efforts were crucial to the
invasion of Russian forces. Without Annenian participation, the Russians would not have
been afforded all of the advantages that should have been in the Ottomans favor.
Knowledge of terrain, troop movements, roads, effective retreat paths, defensive
positions and safe passage were known to the Ottomans and not their Russian enemies.
With the help of the Armenians, however, the Russians were able to utilize all of these in
their invasion. Armenian knowledge of complex terrain made a Russian invasion that
much easier in terms of navigating and utilizing geographic complexities with local
support. Such aspects are still held in high regard concerning modem warfare and
indigenous knowledge of terrain in both insurgent and counterinsurgent operations. 226 It
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would be like trying to imagine the Normandy invasion of June 6, 1944 without the use
of intelligence, disinformation and the 101 51 airborne division.
Western support of the Armenians' cause also greatly hindered the efforts of the
Ottomans to crush the rebellion before it had begun, perhaps saving the lives of
thousands in the end. Support groups and fundraisers continued to prevent the Turks from
mounting a successful campaign against their internal enemies. In one specific case, a
British officer was recruiting an army of refugees in the area ofUrumia which was
pinned between British and Turkish forces. The idea was to pull together a force large
enough to repel the Turks. To help, "indiscreet American missionaries diverted some
$100,000 in relief funds to support this 'Christian Army.' One of the missionary-relief
workers, William Shedd, also the American vice consul at Urumia, seriously
compromised the American government by signing in his capacity as vice consul an offer
to pay the bills of the Christian army.,,227 Contributions such as this were generated by
groups who intended to defeat the Muslim heathens and support their Christian brethren
in the East. However, in order to facilitate a contribution from Americans, "what was
needed was a victim (the Ottoman Christians), a hero (the missionaries), and a villain (the
Turks). Turks and Kurds were portrayed as the sole: cause of the Christian's plight."228
The ABCFM (American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions)
especially, had a vested interest in the well being of the Christian community in the
Ottoman Empire, with special emphasis on the Armenians. Although the ABCFM
claimed to strive for the salvation of mankind through the understanding of Christianity

m Robert L. Daniel, American Philanthropy in the Near East 1820-1960, (Athens: Ohio
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and the western style orthodoxy, there was obviously greater emphasis on educating
Ottoman subjects on western practices. This is confirmed by the number of schools built
versus the number of churches. Between the time that the missionaries arrived in the
Ottoman Empire and the time they were beginning to leave (1850-1913), they had built
450 schools while only building 163 churches.

229

By drawing conclusions between counterinsurgency tactics before or since the
First World War, this thesis demonstrated that justifiable conduct is in the eyes ofthe
beholder. It is necessary to recognize that the Turks were not monsters but pragmatists
faced with a nation in disarray and the destruction of their empire. Not to mention an
uncertain fate for their Muslim subjects should they be defeated, a fate which had
previously been proven worse than death and exile in the Balkans. Not only were their
inspirations, and indeed some of their military tactics derived from Western military
strategy prior to the war, but the Western powers of the twentieth century continued to
operate under the same principles after World War 1. Napoleon Bonaparte wrote that
"God is on the side with the best artillery." The same is true in the recognition of
suffering during wartime. The condemnation of atrocities is generally heard from those
with the loudest microphone or the boldest pen stroke.
In his account of world history, H.G. Wells wrote of the Greco-Turkish war of
1919-1922 saying, "The vitality of the Turk in this phase [post World War I recovery]
was remarkable. He was not only driving back the attacking Greek, but he was, after his
age-long tradition, massacring Armenians, and he was driving the French out of
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Cilicia.,,23o Unfounded history written in such a suggestive manor is damaging to the best
obtainable versions of the truth, the very purpose of writing history itself. Western
historians to follow, in tum, draw inspiration from their predecessors and perpetuate
myths of the "Terrible Turk" and his Armenian blood lust.
The counterinsurgency techniques of the Ottomans have remained under Western
scrutiny with regard to forced relocation. However, against all odds . the Turks managed
to maintain regional security and integrity after losing the greatest war the world had yet
seen. The problem with counterinsurgency operations is that even with doctrinal theory
and application, it is ultimately meant to be a bulleted remedy to a military problem,
wrapped in a nice, neat package containing solutions to rapidly evolving tactics. Unlike
regular warfare, counterinsurgency is a process which is rarely afforded a standard
solution. Michael Schafer argues that,
In fact, counterinsurgency doctrine obscures rather than illuminates critical
distinctions among insurgency-threatened governments and the prospects for aid to them.
As a result, past counterinsurgency operations were undertaken blind, while today the
United States still lacks an ability to read the auguries for victory accurately.23I

If nothing else, this argument highlights the need to adapt in irregular warfare and
illustrates the many challenges faced regarding counterinsurgency operations even in the
twenty-first century.
Byron Farwell wrote of the Boer war saying:
The methods by which guerrillas are overcome are, for humane men, unpalatable
because they involve making war upon entire populations, upon those who in orthodox
warfare are considered noncombatants. But as guerrillas are dependent upon the
noncombatant populations for supplies, inf01mation, and other necessities, and the
passive, if not active, support of the people among whom they move is essential, these
~30 H.G. Wells, The Outline afHistory, (New York: Garden City Books, 1949), 1122
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people - housewives who count the men and guns in the passing column, small boys who
have seen the hiding soldiers in the their ambush, old men who know forgotten paths become a danger to the counter-guerrilla forces and minatory action is taken against
them. So terrorism becomes a standard feature of guerrilla wars.

Middle ground regarding counterinsurgency, irregular, guerrilla or whatever term you
prefer to use, simply does not exist. Notions of man's humanity to his fellow man are
often forgotten in all warfare when his way of life has been threatened. This is true of
both the aggressor and the defender in virtually any conflict. Current counterinsurgency
doctrine of the west strives for a more amiable solution. The fact remains, however, that
in the context of the time, such measures were viewed as an unfortunate necessity in
irregular warfare.
Sean McMeekin wrote that, "Turkish historians, while acknowledging that
thousands of innocents died in the course of the relocations, have tended to emphasize
alleged Armenian treachery at

SankaIm~,

Van, Cilicia and elsewhere, which convinced

the CUP government it had a fifth column on its hands.,,232 This thesis has illustrated that
the threat was in fact very real, and the effectiveness of the Armenian revolutionaries was
detrimental to Ottoman security in the East and esslential to the Russian invasion of
Anatolia. McMeekin goes on to admit that the security threat was indeed real, yet, it was
"overblown" and the Turks management of the forced relocations was "murderous.,,233
Unfortunately, history written in such a way denotes the logistical challenges of
conducting counterinsurgency operations while also fighting a multi-front war.
Perhaps one of the greatest questions which remains unanswered in this thesis is:.
were the Turks justified in their actions? Militarily, it is arguable that the Turks were
232 Sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Etpress: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bidfor
World Power, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 242
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justified simply by examining the probability of annihilation. They had very little time to
act and virtually no money to speak of in order to build camps or shelter in eastern
Anatolia to house the refugee populations - both Muslim and Armenian. However, even
if the Turks had the money and time for such projects, the camps would have to be built
in an area far from the front toward the interior of the country, far enough away from the
battlefield to ensure their safety. Therefore, the refugees would have had to make a long
and arduous trek across county anyway. Also, as previous chapters have illustrated, as
well as a number of scholars, the great killer of men at the time was epidemic; cholera,
typhoid, frostbite, starvation etcetera. Disease and starvation killed most of the interned
in the camps of South Africa and also the majority of interned in the Philippines both
during and after the war.
Were the Turks actions of the First World War morally justifiable in the forced
relocations of thousands of civilians? Obviously not, however, it is important to
remember that perceived necessity often dictates and even usurps morality in times of
crisis. That is not to say that it is justified, yet it is evident that the Turks are not the only
major power to make such a decision in the interest of security and stability. This was
evident in the actions of the Americans in the Philippines and the British in South Africa
as well. The only glaring difference between these lexamples of Western and Ottoman
counterinsurgency is that the West was not directly threatened by insurgency on their
own soil in the midst of a major war on multiple fronts. In its historical context, from a
counterinsurgency standpoint, such decisions to move large numbers of civilians in the
interest of security were a perfectly acceptable solution at that time. Such options are no
longer viable in modem counterinsurgency operations.
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This thesis has demonstrated that, from the Ottoman perspective, there was a
genuine belief in an imminent threat from the insurgent Armenian community. Countless
Ottoman documents have shown that, based on intelligence, the Ottomans recognized the
Armenian will to create their own state in the Ottoman Empire. Though they sided with
Russia in their common hatred toward the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians were willing
to use the avenue of Russian support as a vehicle for attaining independence. It is also
clear, based on Ottoman documents, that the Ottoman government perceived a real threat
to the Muslim population of Eastern Anatolia, and that their decision to forcibly relocate
Armenians was one also made in the interest of protecting its Muslim subjects from
Armenian reprisal.
This thesis has demonstrated the need for future researchers to recognize the
challenges that counterinsurgency operators face, both in the past and the present. It is
essential to remember that warfare, like history itself, is a sprawling and confused
network of information that at times remains an enigma. Historians have a responsibility
to strive for the best obtainable versions of the truth, remembering to always view
research from a variety of angles so that students of history can make informed decisions.

It does one well to remember that there will and have always been innumerable variables
in the examination of history, and that the angle from which we view it should always be
obtuse.
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